1 Politburo confirms date and agenda of upcoming Fourth Plenum
On Sept. 29, Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the CCP Politburo which decided that the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee will be held from Oct. 20 to 23, according to state media reports. The meeting also discussed major issues in formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development, and submitted a revised draft of the Plan to the Fourth Plenum for review.
The meeting said that opinions on the draft proposal for the 15th Five-Year Plan had been solicited both inside and outside the Party. All parties highly endorsed the draft proposal and provided positive evaluations of it, including:
- The Plan accurately grasps China’s historical position, analyzes profound changes in China’s development environment, and provides “top-level design” (頂層設計) and strategic planning for the next five years.
- The Plan serves as a general mobilization and overall deployment for advancing “Chinese-style modernization,” reflecting the leadership of the Party Central with Xi Jinping at the core in maintaining the “two great miracles” of “rapid economic development” and “long-term social stability.”
- The Plan has major and far-reaching impacts on the development of the Party and the country.
The meeting emphasized the principles that must be upheld for economic and social development during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026 to 2030):
- Upholding the Party’s overall leadership, and safeguarding the “quan wei” (authority and prestige) and centralized and unified leadership of Party Central.
- Putting the people first.
- Pursuing high-quality development and developing new productive forces suited to local conditions.
- Deepening reform comprehensively and expanding high-level opening up.
- Combining the roles of the market and the government.
- Coordinating development and security, strengthening bottom-line thinking, and preventing and resolving risks.
The meeting further stressed that upholding and strengthening the CCP’s overall leadership is the fundamental guarantee for advancing Chinese-style modernization, and that the Party’s self-revolution must guide broader social revolution.
Our take
1. The Politburo’s announcement that the upcoming Fourth Plenum will discuss the 15th Five-Year Plan affirms the assessment in our newsletters from back in June and July 2025. We also explained previously why the CCP is deliberating a “Five-Year Plan” in a Fourth Plenum when previous Plans were discussed in Fifth Plenums.
While not stated in the Politburo announcement, it is possible that the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee could discuss some agenda items that are typically associated with Fourth Plenums of the past. Those items include political system reform and Party-building work.
2. In the weeks following the CCP’s commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the “victory of the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japan and the World Anti-Facist War” in Beijing, the Xi leadership has made a strong propaganda push to promote Xi Jinping’s political “achievements” at home (particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang) and his political thought’s major contribution to the development of human civilization. The effort to build up Xi through propaganda could be reflected in the communiqué of the Fourth Plenum.
3. There has been intense speculation in overseas Chinese-speaking circles and media that Xi Jinping is stepping down at the Fourth Plenum and there will be changes to the Politburo Standing Committee. However, we believe that the speculation is founded on flawed analysis of CCP elite politics (see here and here), and barring dramatic political developments in the lead up to the Fourth Plenum, it is extremely unlikely that major personnel changes of the sort that have been speculated will take place at the political conclave.
The Fourth Plenum could still see some personnel changes. For instance, the conclave could officially announce that Politburo member and Central Military Commission vice chairman He Weidong is under investigation. Further, the meeting could revoke the Central Committee membership of purged officials and appoint replacements.
As for potential adjustments to CMC membership, that depends on whether Xi is satisfied with the ongoing military rectification campaign. If the rectification has some ways to go, the composition of the CMC may remain unchanged until the 21st Party Congress.
4. The Politburo’s confirmation that the 15th Five-Year Plan will be deliberated at the Fourth Plenum suggests that Beijing has very likely assessed that trade relations between the U.S. and the PRC will not experience major fluctuations in the near term. Several signs hint at an impending stabilization of Sino-U.S. trade tensions, including President Donald Trump approving a TikTok deal, some Trump administration officials declaring “enormous” progress in trade talks with China, and the PRC giving up new special and differential treatment in current and future negotiations of the World Trade Organization.
Those signs, which hint at concessions on the part of the PRC, could have been made to facilitate the securing of some trade agreements out of the U.S. in the lead up to the Fourth Plenum. If reached, those agreements would help to boost Xi Jinping’s “achievements” and build momentum for the 15th Five-Year Plan discussions.
2 Various signs point to Xi’s enhanced ‘quan wei’ post-Beijing parade
Party elders absent from PRC founding reception
Sept. 30
The CCP held a reception at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to mark the 76th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Per state media reports, Li Qiang presided over reception, and other senior leaders like Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Li Xi, and Han Zheng were in attendance.
Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the reception where he revisited the CCP’s “brilliant achievements,” highlighted the regime’s arduous path from national peril to rejuvenation, and specifically referred to the CCP’s celebration of the “victory of the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japan and the World Anti-Facist War” as a source of national pride.
Xi said that since the beginning of 2025, the PRC has “achieved new progress” in “deepening reform, promoting high-quality development, improving people’s livelihoods, and advancing strict Party governance.” He added that the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee will formulate the 15th Five-Year Plan to “ensure progress towards socialist modernization.”
Xi also called for adhering to “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong, opposing “Taiwan independence,” defending sovereignty, as well as promoting humanity’s shared values and building a community with a shared future for mankind. In concluding, Xi emphasized the CCP’s “historic mission” of realizing the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and urged the entire Party and the Chinese people to unite and strive to advance Chinese-style modernization.
State broadcaster CCTV’s footage of the reception showed that retired national leaders and elder cadres who attended last year’s reception were absent this year. Those leaders and cadres include Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Li Lanqing, Zeng Qinghong, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, He Guoqiang, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli.
CCP continues promoting Xi
Sept. 22 to Sept. 24
The Central Propaganda Department held its first nationwide, “full-coverage” training session for more than 40,000 township (subdistrict) Party Committee propaganda commissioners, according to state media. The theme of the training was the in-depth study and practice of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture.
Sept. 23
State media reported that the Central Party School Press officially published and released a “curriculum system and teaching outline” for Xi Jinping Thought for use in Party member and cadre education and training (習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想課程體系和教學大綱 [黨員、幹部教育培訓使用]; henceforth referred to as the “Outline”)”. The Outline was compiled by the Central Organization Department, the Central Propaganda Department, and the Central Party School.
State media said that the Outline serves as an “important basis” for Party members and cadre education and training institutions to conduct teaching on Xi Jinping Thought. Also, the Central Organization Department, the Central Propaganda Department, and the Central Party School issued a notice urging local governments, departments, and all levels of Party member and cadre training institutions to carefully implement the Xi Jinping Thought education and training program.
Sept. 28
The National Party School Work Conference was held in Beijing. Chen Xi, president of the Central Party School, conveyed Xi Jinping’s important instructions and delivered a speech.
According to state media, Xi Jinping recently issued important instructions on Party school work. In his instructions, Xi affirmed the work of Party schools at all levels since the 18th Party Congress and emphasized that Party schools must adhere to the principle of “Party schools bear the Party’s name” (黨校姓黨) and always remember their original mission.
In his speech, Chen Xi said that it is necessary to thoroughly study and implement Xi’s important instructions, fully grasp Xi’s important discourses on Party school work, more consciously uphold the principle of “Party schools bear the Party’s name,” and firmly hold on to the Party school’s founding mission as the overall requirement.
Sept. 28 to Sept. 29
Multiple mainstream media outlets in Hong Kong and Macau aired a special feature documentary produced by CCTV titled “Xi Jinping’s Cultural Affinity” (習近平的文化情緣) and an extensive special program titled, “Lecture Series on Xi Jinping Economic Thought” (習近平經濟思想系列講讀).
Oct. 1
Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published portions of Xi Jinping’s Sept. 27, 2024 speech at the National Conference on Commendations for Ethnic Unity and Progress, under the title “The Formation and Development of the Chinese National Community is Where People’s Aspirations Lie, the General Trend of the Times, and a Historical Inevitability” (中華民族共同體的形成和發展是人心所向、大勢所趨、歷史必然).
The article claimed that the formation of the Chinese national community is the “inevitable” result of over 5,000 years of civilization, and the outcome of all ethnic groups “jointly expanding territories, building the state, writing history, creating culture, and cultivating shared spirit.”
Regulations on ideological and political work issued
Sept. 28
Party Central issued regulations on the CCP’s ideological and political work (中國共產黨思想政治工作條例) and a notice requiring all regions and departments to conscientiously follow and implement them.
The notice instructed Party Committees and Party leadership groups at all levels to carefully organize the study, publicity, and implementation of the Regulations, strengthen supervision and inspection of how ideological and political work is carried out, and ensure that all provisions of the Regulations are put into practice.
Our take
Rumors and speculation continue to swirl in overseas Chinese-speaking circles and media that Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) has been curbed and he is on his way out at the Fourth Plenum.
However, the various developments above indicate that if anything, Xi has gained in political strength since the Beijing military parade in September.
1. The PRC national day reception provides several subtle signs that hint at Xi Jinping’s increased “quan wei.”
For one, Xi’s speech includes elements of the post-Beijing parade propaganda campaign that essentially indicate that the Party and its cause have made great progress under Xi’s leadership. We previously assessed that this latest propaganda effort is designed to highlight Xi’s importance to the CCP regime so as to justify his taking a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress in 2027. While Xi’s 2025 national day reception speech was only about half as long (nearly 800 characters) as that from last year (about 1,500 characters), he touched on virtually all the same content in both speeches (a historical review, the CCP’s policies towards Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, domestic PRC policies, and China’s international positioning) plus include the post-Beijing parade propaganda.
Another sign is retired senior national leaders and Party cadres who attended the 2024 national day reception were noticeably absent from this year’s reception. This signals that those leaders and cadres are only allowed to appear in public for prominent events at Xi’s discretion, which in turn underscores the enormity of Xi’s current political strength in the CCP.
The aforementioned development also indirectly corroborates our analysis from last year. At the time, some Chinese observers argued that Xi being flanked by Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan at the reception was a sign that Xi was in political trouble. However, we countered that Xi does not have any particular reason to cave to those retired leaders and that he was perhaps putting on a display of intra-Party unity. We also argued that Xi could be indicating that the economic support measures that his leadership rolled out prior to the reception “have the endorsement and support of senior Party cadres and key officials in previous leaderships.”
Another possible reason why Xi “allowed” the retired senior national leaders and Party cadres to attend the reception last year is that it is an unwritten CCP convention to have them present for important “multiple-of-five” or “multiple-of-10” celebrations. For instance, Xi held a military parade in 2019 during the 70th anniversary of the PRC’s founding and some senior national leaders and Party cadres were present for that year’s reception, but those leaders and cadres did not attend the 69th anniversary reception in 2018 or in non “multiple-of-five” or “multiple-of-10” anniversaries during Xi’s first term.
Other notable 2025 national day reception personnel matters include the minister of public security Wang Xiaohong and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection head Liu Jinguo being seated at the main table with Xi Jinping, and the non-attendance of Politburo members Huang Kunming (Guangdong Party secretary), Chen Min’er (Tianjin Party secretary), and Yuan Jiajun (Chongqing Party secretary). It is possible that Huang, Chen, and Yuan could not attend the reception because they had local events that demanded their presence. Meanwhile, the seating of Wang Xiaohong and Liu Jinguo with Xi at the main table indicates that Xi attaches great importance to the CCP’s “knife handle” (domestic security apparatus) and “eastern depot” (disciplinary and supervisory system, to borrow the Ming Dynasty jargon), which in turn hints at Xi’s insecurities about rising domestic instability in the regime and pervasive corruption despite years of “rectification” efforts.
2. Xi Jinping continues to consolidate his “quan wei” through intensifying political indoctrination. Three recent moves — the Central Propaganda Department organizing training for more than 40,000 propaganda commissioners, the Central Party School’s publication of the Outline to guide Party member and cadre education and training in Xi Jinping Thought, and Xi’s “important instructions” on Party School work — indicate that the Xi leadership is making Xi’s political theories the guiding ideology in the CCP.
It is possible that some Party members and cadres could have heard about the rumors and speculation about Xi supposedly “losing power” that are circulating in overseas Chinese-speaking circles. However, those rumors and speculation will likely mean little to those Party members and cadres as they are bombarded with Xi Jinping Thought political indoctrination in study sessions on an almost daily basis.
Meanwhile, the recent Qiushi piece on the “formation and development of the Chinese national community” is an attempt to hammer home to Party members that Xi has surpassed his predecessors in resolving frontier governance issues (see here and here).
3. The rollout of the regulations on the CCP’s ideological and political work is partly intended to instill loyalty towards Xi Jinping among Party cadres and members. When the Politburo reviewed the regulations back in August, it said that the regulations should place Xi Jinping Thought “at the forefront to ‘concentrate the heart and cast the soul’ (凝心鑄魂), unify thinking, build consensus, strengthen confidence, and inspire morale.”
The Politburo also called for “upholding the Party’s leadership in this work, with all members — especially leading cadres — strengthening Party discipline.”