1 CCP self-contradictions revealed in leaked documents concerning discourse control
Recently, a number of leaked CCP internal notices related to public discourse monitoring have been circulating on overseas Chinese-language social media.
Ideological risks
An internal document concerning cybersecurity in Sichuan’s capital Chengdu titled “2025 Q2 Risk Alerts in the Ideological Domain” (2025年第二季度涉意識形態領域風險提示) was circulated online on Aug. 28. The document flagged 38 risk points across eight categories of public discourse.
Some of the issues highlighted include:
Major events
- Regarding the celebration of the “80th Anniversary of Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan” on Sept. 3, officials should display vigilance against the promotion of “false views of Second World War history” and attempts to downplay China’s contribution to victory. Officials should also guard against “anti-China Western forces” competing with Beijing over historical discourse concerning the Second World War.
- Officials should prevent “malicious actors” from disrupting the 12th World Games (held in Chengdu from July 7 to July 17), such as by using Wi-Fi hotspots for counter-propaganda. Officials should also watch out for attempts by foreign intelligence agencies and anti-China organizations to hack event systems, steal sensitive data, and threaten “ideological security.”
- Officials should prevent fan wars among celebrity fanbases (“fan circles”) and “toxic fan culture” during the 2nd Golden Panda Awards (held in Chengdu from Sept. 12 to Sept. 14). Officials should also guard against hostile domestic and foreign actors creating negative reporting about the international event.
- Officials should watch for LGBT groups using major sporting events, music festivals, and concerts to generate media attention through sparking online debates, holding offline gatherings, or expressing “so-called equality demands” in public. Also, officials should monitor consulate staff in Chengdu and Chongqing who may use such opportunities to engage LGBT groups on “sensitive topics,” cultivate agents, and increase ideological infiltration.
Sensitive dates
- Officials should be alert to hostile forces exploiting the 5th anniversary of the U.S. consulate closure in Chengdu to stir up U.S.-China tensions. Officials should also watch for extreme nationalists spreading radical anti-U.S. rhetoric or taking excessive actions.
- Officials should anticipate activities by Falun Gong practitioners around the 26th anniversary of the crackdown (July 20), including efforts to “maliciously attack and smear” CCP political-legal organs and leaders, as well as expose imprisonment, torture, and persecution cases.
- Officials should prevent hostile narratives exaggerating China’s “military threat,” “PLA corruption,” or the plight of veterans around PLA Day (Aug. 1). Officials should also guard against military veterans uniting to defend their rights in large gatherings or extreme ways, which could create political stability risks.
- Officials should be on alert for signs of “historical nihilism” during key Second World War anniversaries, including July 7 (start of full-scale resistance by the Chinese people), Aug. 15 (Japan’s surrender), and Sept. 3 (Victory Day). Officials should also guard against content denying the CCP’s “pillar role” in the war. Additionally, officials should monitor self-media for accounts hyping “patriotism” to incite extreme nationalism, populism, or anti-Japanese sentiment.
Ethnicity and religion
- This year marks the 90th birthday of the 14th Dalai Lama. Officials should keep an eye on Tibetans at home and abroad organizing celebrations or prayer events. Officials should prevent religious crowds from joining illegal gatherings or engaging in flag-waving, portrait-raising, or extreme acts like self-immolation.
- Officials should watch out for religious groups organizing youth-targeted “retreat camps” or similar activities.
- Officials should guard against “Tibet independence” groups and anti-China forces colluding to create trouble on Sept. 9, the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Stock market hype
A notice from the China Securities Regulatory Commission ordering tighter controls on livestreaming by mainland platforms (Douyin, Kuaishou, Baidu, WeChat Video, etc.) ahead of the PRC National Day was leaked online on Aug. 28.
The notice listed several things that streaming platforms are forbidden from:
- No stock-tipping or directing individual stock operations.
- The words “bull market” cannot be placed in titles or visuals.
- No linking the market with major political events (e.g., “Sept. 3 parade bull,” “Two Sessions,” “National Day”).
- No incitement of new retail investors to rush into the market.
- No market index predictions.
- No rumors or short essays about the stock market.
CCP recruits cyber monitors with high pay
A leaked job ad from the Ministry of Public Security’s Third Research Institute Cyber Investigation Center for “internet illegal information inspection” positions circulated online on Aug. 27:
- Requirements: Applicants should have a bachelor’s degree or higher (law, journalism, computer science preferred), CET-4 English proficiency or equivalent, as well as a “firm political stance and support for Party policies.”
- Duties: Hires will proactively patrol the internet for information harmful to national security, public safety, social order, or citizens’ rights. They will identify, classify, analyze, and report such findings to their superiors.
- Salary: 7,000 yuan to 12,000 per month.
Tightening scrutiny on ‘ultra-nationalist little pinks’
Recently, information circulating on Chinese social media indicates that the CCP authorities’ content moderators have been ordered to strengthen the review and deletion of ultra-nationalist comments by “little pink.” As a result, some “little pink” accounts have been banned, muted, and had their recent ad revenues confiscated.
Our take
The CCP walks a tightrope in controlling public discourse to maintain the regime’s stability. On the one hand, the regime is looking to clamp down on discourse that threatens its security and ideological control, harness “nationalism” and “patriotism” to solidify its rule, and guard against subversion by external “hostile forces.” On the other hand, excessive discourse control, surveillance, and jingoism could build up internal contradictions to the point where it exacerbates social unrest.
The internal CCP documents that were recently leaked highlight the regime’s predicaments in discourse control across multiple domains.
1. The Chengdu internal document on identifying “risks alerts in the ideological domain” exposes what the CCP believes will threaten its rule and some of the contradictions in its stability maintenance strategy.
i) The document shows the Party’s quandary in ideological control. Even as the regime strives to bolster its legitimacy through historical narratives and pivotal events, it dreads the subversion or distortion of those narratives, such as the CCP’s commemoration of China’s victory in World War II. Outwardly, Beijing eagerly promotes the CCP’s “contributions” and “pillar role” in the conflict. Yet internally, Beijing wants its internet “hall monitors” to guard against displays of “historical nihilism” (i.e. discourse that challenges the CCP’s narrative, including historically accurate accounts of the Party’s feigned resistance against the Imperial Japanese forces), particularly around sensitive dates related to the war.
The document also shows that the CCP is wary of the negative impact that its promotion of “patriotism” could engender. Notably, officials are instructed to clamp down on “extreme nationalists” who spread anti-U.S. rhetoric and anti-Japanese sentiments; such excesses could provoke social instability and strain diplomatic ties during a period of geopolitical turbulence. Here, the CCP’s stability tactics teeter on a knife’s edge — it must leverage “patriotism” and stoke anti-foreign animosities to deflect internal grievances, but overzealous promotion risks populist backlash. Meanwhile, the suppression of “historical nihilism” reveals the regime’s manipulative grip on history and underlying insecurity.
ii) The document’s call to guard against apolitical “fan circles” at the 2nd Golden Panda Awards reflects the CCP’s profound fear of mass gatherings. Aside from the potential of rabid fans to spark social unrest over unforeseen incidents, the CCP does not want domestic and external “hostile forces” to exploit inflamed mass gatherings and redirect their ire towards the regime or facilitate ideological infiltration (this is hinted at from the instructions regarding the 12th World Games).
iii) The document’s instruction on Falun Gong reveals the continuing or renewed intensity of the persecution campaign that was originally launched by Jiang Zemin and a longstanding internal contradiction. While the CCP publicly declared “victory” over Falun Gong in 2003, it still struggles to suppress the group more than two decades later. Notably, the document’s earlier call to stop “Wi-Fi hotspot counter-propaganda” is an indirect recognition of a tactic used by Falun Gong adherents to disseminate information exposing the regime. This suggests that Falun Gong is persistently active in China today despite the CCP’s propaganda, and remains a priority “stability maintenance” target.
iv) The document’s call to “prevent hostile narratives” about the plight of military veterans around PLA Day highlights the regime’s internal fragility. The CCP views veteran protests about corruption and rights defense matters as powder kegs, and fears the possibility of veterans again “besieging” the Central Military Commission headquarters in Beijing or other sensitive locations.
v) The document’s instructions regarding Tibet expose the CCP’s challenges in governing China’s frontier regions. Even as Beijing proclaims “ethnic unity,” it dreads the possibility of religious activities transforming into “Tibetan independence” incidents. While there are external actors constantly highlighting the Tibet issue, tensions in Tibet are also the byproduct of the CCP’s longstanding repressive policies.
2. The leaked notice by the China Securities Regulatory Commission calling for tighter control over livestreaming platforms hints at the CCP’s acute sensitivity to economic and financial discourse as it manipulates the markets to prop up China’s economic stability.
On the one hand, Beijing appears to be engineering a “water buffalo rally” via monetary easing and rhetoric control ahead of the Sept. 3 military parade and PRC National Day on Oct. 1, likely to brighten China’s growth prospects and lure retail investors into stimulating consumption. On the other hand, Beijing does not want its “water buffalo rally” bubble, which is detached from economic fundamentals, to be popped by streamers and commentators engaging in hype and speculation. In particular, the CCP does not want the market to start tanking in sync with sensitive dates and inciting investor discontent toward the regime.
3. The MPS’s recruitment of “internet illegal information inspectors” and targeting of “little pinks” further reveals the paradoxes facing the CCP in its efforts at “stability maintenance.”
The CCP relies on “little pinks” and other ardent believers in the regime to amplify its messaging and propaganda. Yet the Party dreads that their excesses — peddling anti-American and anti-Japanese rhetoric, or inadvertently exposing historical inconsistencies — could generate social chaos or otherwise counterproductive outcomes. As a result, Beijing has to censor its most fervent adherents and waste even more resources in controlling public discourse. This represents the self-devouring aspect of the CCP propaganda machine — it nurtures zealots for the regime, only to later deem them as destabilizing elements who need to be subjected to corrective censorship.
2 Xi strengthens ideological indoctrination, Party rectification ahead of sensitive period
CCP doubles down on promoting Xi
Aug. 29
1. The Politburo held a meeting where it reviewed regulations on the CCP’s ideological and political work (中國共產黨思想政治工作條例; henceforth referred to as the Regulations) and a draft law on promoting ethnic unity and progress in the PRC (中華人民共和國民族團結進步促進法 [草案]). The meeting, which Xi Jinping chaired, also discussed workplace safety, disaster prevention, and other issues, according to state media reports.
Highlights from the meeting include:
Ideological and political work
The meeting stressed that ideological and political work is a “distinct political advantage” of the CCP, and enacting the Regulations will help strengthen the Party’s overall leadership in this area.
The meeting also called for:
- Giving full play to the guiding role of ideological and political work. Xi Jinping Thought should be placed at the forefront to “concentrate the heart and cast the soul” (凝心鑄魂), unify thinking, build consensus, strengthen confidence, and inspire morale.
- Strengthening and improving ideological and political work under new conditions, adapting the work to social changes, and enhancing its focus and effectiveness.
- Upholding the Party’s leadership in this work, with all members — especially leading cadres — strengthening Party discipline.
Draft law on promoting ethnic unity and progress
The meeting noted that legislation would transform the Party’s major theories and practices on ethnic work into “state will” (國家意志), and establish mechanisms to strengthen the “Chinese national community consciousness” (中華民族共同體意識).
The meeting called for:
- Consolidating the common ideological and political foundation for all ethnic groups to unite and strive together, while upholding the Party’s leadership and the “correct path” of solving ethnic issues with Chinese characteristics.
- Strengthening the forging of a “Chinese national community consciousness” and advancing community-building.
- Ensuring proper drafting, adoption, and implementation of the law.
2. The Central Leading Group on Party-building held a meeting to convey Xi Jinping’s important instructions, summarize education on implementing the Central Eight-point Regulation, and deploy measures to consolidate and extend achievements, enforce discipline, and normalize work-style building.
The meeting was chaired by Cai Qi, head of the group, with Li Xi (deputy head) speaking. Other attendees included Central Organization Department head Shi Taifeng, Central Propaganda Department head Li Shulei, and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference vice chairman Mu Hong.
Xi Jinping stressed in his instructions that Party conduct reflects Party image, affects popular support, and concerns the Party’s survival. He called for strict and ongoing implementation of the Eight-point Regulation, noting the persistence and recurrence of the “four forms of decadence” (formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance) and urging perseverance and determination in waging a “tough and protracted battle” against them. Xi also praised the effectiveness of the Eight-point Regulation education campaign.
3. The CCP General Office circulated a notice from the Central Propaganda Department and Central Organization Department on thoroughly studying “Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, Volume V.”
The volume contains 91 items (reports, speeches, articles, instructions, etc.) from May 27, 2022 to Dec. 20, 2024, organized into 18 topics. The notice added that some of the items in the volume are published for the first time.
The notice said the purpose of the volume is to deepen learning and implementation of Xi Jinping Thought among Party members, cadres, and the public, while enabling the international community to “understand China’s ideas, proposals, and wisdom” and promote the so-called “community of shared future for mankind.”
The notice praised the volume as the latest achievement of “Marxism adapted to the Chinese context and the present era,” as well as a “wise” contribution to building a shared future for humanity.
The notice made the following instructions:
- Party theoretical study groups must include the volume in study plans.
- Party schools and cadre institutes must incorporate the volume into training programs.
- Universities must use the volume as a key text for ideological and political education.
- Party lecturers, cultural practice centers, and local media must step up propaganda efforts to promote the volume.
Our take
The bulk of the documents and meetings above appear to be designed to further consolidate Xi Jinping’s power and enhance his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) in the regime. Xi appears to be emphasizing political indoctrination (promotion of Xi’s political theories) and intra-Party rectification (promotion of the Eight-point Regulation) ahead of several major events (Sept. 3 military parade, Oct. 1 PRC National Day, and the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee in October) to fortify his personal authority and better navigate mounting domestic economic strains, international geopolitical headwinds, and latent intra-Party discord.
Through doubling down on thought control and internal cleansing of the Party, Xi seems to be preempting crises ahead and facilitating his taking a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress in 2027.
1. The Regulations on ideological and political work of the CCP and Xi’s instructions to the Central Leading Group on Party-building on enforcing the Eight-point Regulation are geared towards heightened political indoctrination and intra-Party rectification in the lead up to the 21st Party Congress.
- The investigation of former CMC Political Work Department head Miao Hua may have alerted Xi to serious shortcomings in ensuring political loyalty in the military. Therefore, Xi is looking to strengthen the CCP’s leadership over ideological and political work to ensure that officials “concentrate the heart and cast the soul” with “Xi Jinping Thought.”
- Xi’s talk of the “persistence and recurrence” of the “four forms of decadence” and the need to wage a “tough and protracted battle” against them signals the continuation and intensification of purges within the Party to enforce absolute ideological and political loyalty towards Xi. While not entirely analogous, Xi appears to be enacting an updated Yan’an Rectification Campaign (Xi hinted at this immediately after the 20th Party Congress) to ensure that no cadre dares to challenge his authority and properly implements his orders.
- The focus on ideological and political work, coupled with the Sept. 3 military parade at Tiananmen Square where Xi will be seated with important foreign dignitaries, is meant to enhance Xi’s “quan wei” and show that he wields absolute control over the PLA.
- The focus on ideological and political work is likely also intended to clear away, forcibly or otherwise, any internal doubts and roadblocks regarding Xi’s economic policies (likely as part of the 15th Five-Year Plan) that would be unveiled at the Fourth Plenum in October. The institutionalizing of “long-term normalized” enforcement of discipline through emphasizing the Eight-point Regulation allows Xi to better apply “layer-by-layer pressure transmission” (層層傳導壓力) and ensure that the plenary sessions and Xi’s plans proceed according to his will.
2. The fifth volume of Xi Jinping’s collected works covers the tail end of the “zero-COVID” and immediate post-“zero-COVID” years (2022 to 2024). The volume will likely repackage the various policy failures under the Xi leadership during that period as “successes” to bolster Xi’s “quan wei” and credit him with more “achievements.”
The Party-wide effort to study “Xi Jinping Thought” is functionally equivalent to the campaign to study Mao Zedong’s “Little Red Book” during the Cultural Revolution. Cadres are directed to internalize the narrative that the Xi leadership can “overcome obstacles and forge ahead” despite a “severe and complex international environment” and “difficult domestic reform, development, and stability tasks.” The ongoing indoctrination campaign positions Xi Jinping Thought as the CCP’s guiding doctrine, strengthens the Xi personality cult, and provides ideological legitimacy for his continued rule.
3. The draft law on promoting ethnic unity and progress that the Politburo reviewed appears to be a move by the CCP to legalize and institutionalize its Sinicization policies towards ethnic minorities in China’s frontier regions.
Xi Jinping’s iron-fisted efforts since his first term to quell ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet are now being framed as the promotion of a “Chinese national community consciousness” under the draft law. The draft law also seeks to formalize the systemic promotion of a Han-centric and Party-centric culture, with the likely goal of erasing minority identities under the banner of combating extremism.
4. Beijing’s moves to promote Xi Jinping’s political theories and primacy in the regime indicate that contrary to incessant external rumors and speculation, Xi’s grip on power is solid and he remains firmly in control. Had Xi really “lost power,” the CCP (including Party elders) would not be wasting time promoting Xi and practically enshrining his political theories as a doctrine to guide the Party’s actions.