PLA training session reveals aftermath of Xi’s political rectification; the CCP’s strategic objectives with the Xi-Cheng meeting

  1   PLA training session reveals aftermath of Xi’s political rectification campaign

  Xi lectures senior officers on political rectification

On April 8, Xi Jinping attended the opening ceremony of a training session for senior military officers held at the People’s Liberation Army National Defence University. Zhang Shengmin, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, chaired the ceremony. Per state media reports, attendees included participants of the first session of the senior officer training session, as well as principal officials from departments of the CMC and relevant Beijing-based military units. The event was conducted via a teleconference format, with sub-venues set up at military units at the corps level and above across the armed forces.

Xi delivered an important speech at the opening ceremony. Key points from the speech include:

• The military should be guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, as well as conduct ideological rectification and deepen political consolidation (開展思想整風，深化政治整訓).
• The PLA must ensure political steadfastness through theoretical clarity.
• Military leaders, especially senior officers, must take the lead in strictly observing intra-party political life.
• Cadres at all levels in the military must consciously understand their roles, abide by laws and discipline, follow rules, and maintain a sense of accountability and restraint.
• The CCP and the military have continuously grown stronger through struggles against incorrect ideological trends and work styles.

  Brief history of PLA rectification post-20th Party Congress

June 2023
Following the exposure of severe corruption in the PLA Rocket Force, the Xi Jinping leadership launched a new round of mass purges within the military.

June 2024
Xi Jinping convened a CMC political work conference in Yan’an City in Shaanxi. During the meeting, Xi spoke bluntly about “deep-seated problems” within the military, including weakened political consciousness, diminished organizational capacity, and corruption in conduct. The conference emphasized the need to “eradicate the soil and conditions that breed corruption” (剷除腐敗滋生的土壤和條件).

The meeting’s location and topic led many external observers to label it as the “Second Gutian Conference.” Subsequently, the PLA was subjected to political rectification. Unlike earlier anti-corruption and rectification efforts that focused on financial corruption, the political rectification targeting the military placed great emphasis on absolute political reliability. Beijing’s likely objective of this rectification was ensuring that the military follows orders without question during potential military operations (such as those involving the Taiwan Strait), allowing no room for hesitation or internal instability.

November 2024
CMC Political Work Department director Miao Hua was officially investigated. Miao oversaw personnel matters and ideological control across the entire military, and was a key figure in implementing the political rectification of the PLA.

Miao’s downfall signaled that the department responsible for “purifying the organization” was itself tainted, and that Beijing had to subject the PLA to an even more thorough “self-revolution” process.

July 2025
The CMC issued provisions on “fully eliminating the toxic influence and reshaping the image and authority of political cadres” (全面肅清流毒影響重塑政治幹部形象威信的若干規定). The provisions are likely part of an effort by Beijing to restore the credibility of the PLA’s political work system after it had been “damaged” by the purge of Miao Hua.

October 2025
The Xi leadership officially disciplined nine generals, including Miao Hua and former CMC vice chairman He Weidong.

January 2026
The Xi leadership officially purged CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia and chief of the CMC joint staff department Liu Zhenli.

The move adds another objective to the ongoing political rectification of the PLA, namely, a comprehensive restructuring of the top military leadership (alongside cleaning up corruption and ensuring that the rank and file are absolutely loyal to Xi and the CCP).

  Our take

Xi Jinping’s call to “conduct ideological rectification and deepen political consolidation” at the PLA National Defense University event indicates that the military will be subjected to an extensive purge and leadership reorganization. Notably, Xi’s combined use of “rectification” (整風) and “consolidation” (整訓) foreshadows a movement that reaches deep into the foundations of power and involves a systematic purging of factions.

1. Xi’s definition of the training session as a “rectification” indicates that its purpose is not merely educational. Rather, the session is also a political screening of sorts that concerns the political survival of all officers in attendance. In a sense, the ongoing rectification of the PLA mirrors the 1942 Yan’an Rectification Movement where Mao Zedong sought to establish absolute and singular loyalty to his person through high-pressure political indoctrination efforts and self-criticism. Xi had previously signaled that his “self-revolution” campaign would be a Yan’an Rectification Movement-style effort when he brought the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee on an inspection tour to Yan’an after the 20th Party Congress.

Several other critical political observations can be made in parsing Xi Jinping’s speech at the PLA National Defense University:

• By placing “rectification” in a prominent position in his speech at the PLA National Defense University, Xi is implying the existence of systemic political disloyalty or “two-faced individuals” within the PLA.
• Xi said, “Our Party and our military have continuously grown and strengthened through struggle against various erroneous thoughts and styles.” This formulation highlights the normalized role of power struggle in CCP politics.
• By calling for “ensuring political firmness through theoretical clarity,” Xi is requiring senior officers to unconditionally accept his political theories. This implies that professional military judgment must yield to political directives going forward. Officers who show hesitation based on professional considerations could be labeled as “theoretically confused” and dealt with.
• Xi urged officers to “consciously position oneself correctly” (自覺擺正位置) and “hold awe in one’s heart” (知敬畏). This is a very explicit warning to senior officers that they should recognize their subordinate status under the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System” (i.e. to the CMC chairman Xi Jinping) and must not harbor any “special interests” or “self-serving motives.” The warning also addresses the issue of “veteran generals” like Zhang Youxia having potential independent influence in the PLA.

2. The training session at the PLA National Defense University and subsequent military rectification efforts are likely part of the extensive “political physical exam” that Beijing is forcing the PLA to undergo in the aftermath of the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli purge.

We previously wrote: “Military Party Committees will be left ‘semi-paralyzed’ for several weeks, and even months, as Party secretaries and principal leaders undergo closed-door political reviews. Such vetting could result in the dismissal, investigation, or retirement of upwards of thousands of officers, triggering a wave of early personnel reshuffles (local government reshuffles are due later this year). It is possible that the Xi leadership will take advantage of the personnel reshuffle opportunities stemming from ‘rectifying’ the PLA and the probe of Zhang and Liu’s networks to replace all ‘two-faced persons’ in the military and put to use ‘truly loyal, reliable, consistent, responsible, and accountable good cadres,’ as per Xi Jinping’s speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCDI.”

An intense and extensive rectification campaign will undoubtedly constrain the PLA’s operational capabilities for a period. For Xi, however, eliminating so-called “two-faced” actors and ensuring political security clearly takes priority over combat readiness.

3. Just three full generals were in attendance at the opening ceremony of the training session per official footage from state broadcaster CCTV’s primetime program Xinwen Lianbo: CMC vice chairman Zhang Shengmin, defense minister Dong Jun, and Central Theater Command commander Han Shengyan.

The paucity of full generals at the event is an extremely unusual development. For instance, most theater commanders and service chiefs at the full theater-command level (typically full generals) would be expected to attend all-military meetings like the training session or those of similar scale, yet only one (Han Shengyan) was present this time.

The widespread absences of senior officers at the PLA National Defense University event suggest that the current cohort of active-duty full generals is undergoing political review, and there could be a transitional vacuum if some have been removed. To some extent, the absences are a quantifiable, visual indicator of the progress of Xi’s purge.

4. State media reported that the attendees of the training session opening ceremony mainly included first-phase participants, as well as principal officials from various departments of the CMC and relevant military units stationed in Beijing. The presence of just three full generals at the opening ceremony, however, suggests that nearly all theater command-level unit chiefs (full generals) appointed at the 20th Party Congress and stationed in Beijing have already been reshuffled, likely because they have been placed under investigation or have been forced into early retirement. Meanwhile, senior commanders from non-Beijing units may not yet have been included in the first phase of participants.

Based on publicly available information, a number of key PLA departments and theater command-level positions (which should normally be held by full generals) currently appear to be filled on an acting basis by lieutenant generals (sometimes referred to as the “new guard” [少壯派]). This indicates so many full generals have been purged or are in trouble to the point where staffing requirements can no longer be met from drawing on the existing pool.

Headquarters of the five service branches
Ground Force

• Commander: Lt. Gen. Cai Zhijun (acting since July 2025)
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Zhang Shuguang (acting since July 2025)

Navy

• Commander: Lt. Gen. Zhang Zheng (acting since December 2025; chief of staff, overseeing military affairs)
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Hu Yuhai (acting since December 2025; Director of Political Work Department, overseeing political affairs)

Air Force

• Commander: Lt. Gen. Wang Gang (acting since December 2025)
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Hong Gan (acting since December 2025)

Rocket Force

• Commander: Lt. Gen. Lei Kai (acting since December 2025)
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Zhou Jingjiong (acting since December 2025)

Core departments of the CMC

• Joint Staff Department
  • Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. Zhu Chuansheng (acting; former chief Liu Zhenli under investigation)
• Political Work Department
  • Director: Work chaired by deputy director Lt. Gen. Chen Demin (former director Miao Hua under investigation)
• Discipline Inspection Commission
  • Zhang Shengmin was promoted to CMC vice chairman while concurrently serving as secretary of the military’s commission for discipline inspection

Senior military academies and research institutions
Academy of Military Science

• President: Vacant
• Political commissar: Gen. Ling Huanxin (absent)

National Defense University

• President: Gen. Xiao Tianliang (absent)
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Zhong Shaojun (absent)

People’s Armed Police

• Commander: Lt. Gen. Peng Jingtang (acting since December 2025)
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Wang Hongbin (acting since December 2025)

Five Theater Commands

Central Theater Command

• Commander: Gen. Han Shengyan
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Liang Ping (acting since October 2025)

Eastern Theater Command

• Commander: Gen. Yang Zhibin
• Political commissar: Gen. Zhang Jichun (acting since September 2025)

Southern Theater Command

• Commander: Gen. Wu Yanan (appointed July 2024)
• Political commissar: Gen. Wang Wenquan (appointed December 2023)

Western Theater Command

• Commander: Lt. Gen. Wen Junfei (appointed September 2025, overseeing military affairs)
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Zhang Shaoying (appointed September 2025, overseeing political affairs)

Northern Theater Command

• Commander: Lt. Gen. Liu Wenqi (acting since September 2025)
• Political commissar: Lt. Gen. Li Dongyou (acting since September 2025)

This “lieutenant general–ization” (i.e., widespread acting appointments by lower-ranking officers) is an inevitable outcome of Xi’s massive purge of the PLA. It is possible that senior officers who sufficiently demonstrate “absolute loyalty” to Xi and the CCP during this round of “Yan’an-style” ideological rectification could be promoted to full general ahead of PLA Day on August 1 this year.

5. The more junior generals serving in acting roles following the ongoing extensive purge of full generals are likely to be experiencing an unprecedented sense of insecurity and are likely to display extraordinary compliance to the “Xi core” as they search for political security. This compliance strengthens Xi Jinping’s micro-level control over the PLA and helps him clear personnel and other obstacles that are impeding the military from reaching its centenary objectives in 2027.

Xi’s strong-armed method of military restructuring is geared towards attaining absolute political control. Indeed, there is now a “generational rupture” in the PLA’s power structure where the military patronage networks represented by figures (i.e. Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Miao Hua) who are potentially “tainted” by the politics and practices of the Jiang Zemin faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012) are being systematically dismantled, and the “young guard” of senior officers who are less “tainted” by the Jiang era are stepping into the fore. This “rupture” is not without consequences; the widespread reliance on acting appointments caused by large-scale purges introduces significant uncertainties for the PLA’s medium- to long-term command effectiveness and combat readiness mindset.

 

  2   Analyzing the CCP’s strategic objectives with the Xi-Cheng meeting

  Xi meets Taiwan’s opposition leader in Beijing

On April 10, PRC leader Xi Jinping met Kuomintang chairwoman Cheng Li-wun in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Cheng was leading a Taiwanese delegation on a visit to mainland China that she characterized as a “peace mission.” This was the first meeting between leaders of the CCP and the KMT in a decade, and was seen as a crucial continuation of high-level dialogue mechanisms between the two parties.

Positions and statements
Xi Jinping

• Xi outlined four points regarding the development of cross-strait relations
  • Persist in upholding the correct national identity to foster emotional connection.
  • Persist in safeguarding the shared homeland through peaceful development.
  • Persist in enhancing the people’s well-being through exchanges and integration.
  • Achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” through unity and struggle.
• Xi emphasized that “the future of cross-strait relations must be firmly in the hands of the Chinese people themselves.”
• Xi proposed three goals: seeking peace for both sides, welfare for compatriots, and national rejuvenation.
• Xi reaffirmed adherence to the “1992 Consensus,” resolutely opposing “Taiwan independence,” and the political foundation of “never tolerating, never condoning” (決不姑息、決不容忍) secession.

Cheng Li-wun

• Cheng proposed five initiatives for building a peace framework, emphasizing the need to resolve differences and that the Taiwan Strait should not become a chessboard for external powers.
• Cheng specifically raised the issue of expanding Taiwan’s “international participation space.”
• According to post-meeting accounts, Xi responded positively to Cheng’s remarks, indicating willingness to make reasonable arrangements through cross-strait consultations under the premise of not violating the “One China” principle.

PRC propaganda and external observations

PRC media

• Mainland outlets such as Xinhua published commentaries claiming that the Xi-Cheng meeting inspired compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to work together toward national rejuvenation.
• State broadcaster CCTV started airing the drama “Swords into Plowshares” (Taipingnian, 天平年) in late January 2026. The drama tells the story of Qian Chu, the last king of Wuyue, during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. Qian earned the reputation of peace bringer for his unconditional surrender to the Song Dynasty in a bid to spare the people of Jiangnan from devastation. The opening episode of CCTV’s drama depicted the extreme suffering of civilians under warlord fragmentation, with people treated as expendable resources and bodies littering the roads. All in all, the drama series is likely intended to serve as an indirect allegory to the current China-Taiwan situation, and instill the sense that division leads to catastrophe, while unity brings peace and prosperity. The drama also portrays resistance to unification negatively, including the depiction of Li Yu (the third ruler of the Southern Tang state) as an incompetent ruler whose defiance in the face of Song superiority led to the fall of his realm and his own demise.

International media

• Publications such as The Wall Street Journal saw the meeting as a sign that Beijing continues to encourage political forces in Taiwan to move closer to mainland China amid an increasingly complex international environment.

***
On April 12, the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office released ten policy measures to promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation. The Office said that the measures were a response to the consensus reached during Cheng Li-wun’s visit to the mainland and to further advance cross-strait integration.

A summary of key points in the measures is as follows:

1. Strengthening party-to-party and youth exchanges

• Regularized communication: Establish a normalized communication mechanism between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang on the basis of upholding the “1992 Consensus” and opposing “Taiwan independence.”
• Youth platforms: Create an institutionalized two-way youth exchange platform between the two parties, with regular activities and large-scale invitations for Taiwanese youth groups to visit the mainland.

2. Promoting infrastructure and transportation facilitation

• “Four links” for Kinmen and Matsu: Advance projects connecting Fujian’s coastal areas with Kinmen and Matsu in water, electricity, gas, and bridge infrastructure.
• Restoration of flight routes: Promote the full resumption of cross-strait direct passenger flights, supporting the reopening of routes to cities such as Urumqi, Xi’an, Harbin, Kunming, and Lanzhou, and supporting Kinmen’s shared use of Xiamen’s new airport.

3. Deepening economic, trade, and fisheries cooperation

• Mainland access for agricultural and fishery products: Facilitate imports of Taiwanese agricultural, fishery, and food products that meet inspection standards, and support their participation in mainland trade fairs.
• Fisheries access: Explore building port facilities to serve Taiwan’s distant-water fishing vessels and facilitate the sale of their catches in the mainland.
• Support for SMEs: Plan to establish new small-scale cross-strait commodity trading markets to help Taiwanese small and micro enterprises expand into the mainland market.

4. Promoting film, television, cultural, and tourism exchanges

• Media access: Allow “high-quality” Taiwanese TV dramas, documentaries, and animations to be broadcast on mainland satellite TV and online platforms; encourage Taiwanese participation in short-form drama production.
• Resumption of travel to Taiwan: Promote pilot programs to resume individual travel (independent tourism) to Taiwan (main island) for residents of Shanghai and Fujian Province.

  Historical background of KMT leaders visiting mainland China

Since Lien Chan’s “ice-breaking visit” in 2005, meetings between CCP and KMT leaders — such as the 2015 Xi–Chu (Eric Li-luan Chu) meeting, the 2016 Xi–Hung (Hung Hsiu-chu) meeting, and the 2024 Xi–Ma (Ma Ying-jeou) meeting — have become an important channel for managing cross-strait relations.

During the tenures of former KMT chairmen Eric Chu or Lien Chan, the focus of meetings was largely placed on the distribution of tangible interests, such as agricultural procurement, reciprocal economic and trade benefits, or cross-strait direct flights. The most significant divergence in Cheng Li-wun’s recent meeting lies in the discussion regarding Taiwan’s international space for activities.

The CCP appeared to have downgraded its treatment of Cheng compared to previous KMT chairs. During Lien Chan’s first visit, the CCP rolled out the red carpet for him and he was accorded with a top-level diplomatic reception. By contrast, Cheng did not receive ceremonial honors or high-level motorcade arrangements.

Against the backdrop of the Democratic Progressive Party’s governance and the suspension of official cross-strait communication mechanisms, the visits by KMT chairs to the PRC have been perceived by some as diminishing the standing of the Republic of China.

  International backdrop

The Xi-Li meeting came amid the backdrop of conflict in the Middle East between the United States and Israel on one side against Iran. The U.S.-Iran war led to the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a draining of U.S. military assets into the region, including a reallocation of assets in the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to visit China on May 14 and May 15. The Trump trip, which was previously scheduled for the end of March, was pushed back over the war in Iran.

  Our take

1. Beijing is taking advantage of the high-level meeting between CCP boss Xi Jinping and KMT leader Cheng Li-wun to advance the Party’s narratives on cross-strait issues and subtly nudge Taiwan further along the path of “peaceful reunification.”

The four points proposed by Xi Jinping during the Xi-Li meeting reflect Beijing’s current strategy of dealing with Taiwan. By balancing “soft integration” rhetoric and incentives with the unyielding “political framing” that Taiwan and the PRC belong together (“compatriots on both sides of the Strait are all Chinese, members of one family,” etc.), Xi is constructing a nationalist “moral high ground” to advance the CCP’s “reunification” goal.

Xi advances several of the CCP’s usual arguments on the Taiwan issue in his remarks. First, Xi’s comments on how Taiwan and mainland China are “members of one family” is an effort to frame cross-strait differences as merely “internal contradictions” that should be settled “domestically.” Therefore, “hostile foreign forces” should not be allowed to intervene; Beijing has both the capability and the intent to shape developments in the Taiwan Strait. Second, Xi’s remark that the differences between social systems and political propositions in the PRC and ROC should not be an excuse for division is intended to neutralize the perceived legitimacy advantage of Taiwan’s democratic system over the mainland’s authoritarian model. Third, Xi’s reference to the shared civilizational history between the ethnic Chinese on both sides of the strait and the linking of “reunification” with the PRC’s “national rejuvenation” appears to be an attempt to dominate the moral and historical narrative and constrain the government of William Lai Ching-te on that issue.

Meanwhile, Cheng Li-wun’s five proposals are essentially an attempt by the KMT to return cross-strait relations to the “diplomatic truce” model of the Ma Ying-jeou era, utilizing a “peace dividend” to hedge against the conflict risks brought by DPP administrations. For Beijing, these proposals align broadly with CCP talking points and represent the “dividends” of its long-term “united front” efforts in Taiwan. Naturally, Xi responded positively to Cheng, pledging that Beijing could conduct “comprehensive and proactive research, coordination, and facilitation” of her proposals.

Cheng and the KMT’s latest trip to mainland China will enable them to better “sell” their political message and vision in Taiwan — namely, that the KMT is able to communicate “productively” with Beijing and parlay that engagement into “substantive international space” and “peace” for the island and that, by contrast, the DPP’s approach has led to Taiwan’s international “isolation” (per the KMT’s framing; the reality is somewhere in between) and heightened military risk.

2. The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office’s ten policy measures, which the KMT characterised as a “major gift package,” bundles economic “incentives” with strategic “tethering.” Through the measures, Beijing is looking to subtly drive divisions in Taiwanese society while advancing the propaganda narrative of how greater CCP-KMT cooperation will produce a “peace” and “prosperity” dividend.

Taiwan’s economy has exhibited a pronounced K-shaped divergence following the shift of its overall trade orientation from mainland China towards the United States. Fueled by the global AI wave, Taiwan’s 2025 GDP growth reached 8.63 percent. In that same year, the U.S. surpassed mainland China and Hong Kong for the first time to become Taiwan’s largest export market (30.9 percent versus 26.6 percent). However, not all segments of Taiwan’s economy have benefited as has the high-end tech sector. Exports in Taiwan’s traditional manufacturing sectors (such as base metals, chemicals, and plastics) saw a decline in 2025. The service and traditional manufacturing industries, which employ the vast majority of Taiwan’s labor force, face wage stagnation and weak domestic demands.

The ten measures introduced by the Taiwan Affairs Office (covering agricultural and fishery products, small-scale trade, media exchange, and tourism) are not aimed at high-tech firms that have already “decoupled” from the mainland, but rather at those at the “lower end” of the K-shaped divide, namely, small and micro enterprises (SMEs), farmers and fishermen, and grassroots service workers. Beijing’s calibrated “profit-sharing” with Taiwanese industries that have been “left out” by globalization and “decoupling” appears to be an attempt at courting their goodwill, and in doing so, amplify social divisions within Taiwan, channel support towards the KMT, and heap pressure on the incumbent DPP government.

The measures lay the groundwork for Beijing to “sideline” the DPP government and influence Taiwan elections in favor of the KMT. For one, the call to establish a “normalized communication mechanism” between the CCP and the KMT creates the impression that the PRC is willing to engage in “good faith” diplomacy and address security and other major cross-strait concerns, but just not with the DPP. Also, Beijing proposed normalizing direct flights and restoring mainland tourism knowing full well that the initiatives may not be implemented without official authorization and dialogue from the DPP government. This fits with the CCP’s broader cognitive warfare strategy — when the measures fail to materialize, Beijing and the KMT can jointly fault the “provocation and obstruction” of the Lai Ching-te administration, and hopefully chip away at the ruling party’s political credit ahead of the 2028 Taiwan elections.

Meanwhile, the strategic significance of Beijing’s proposed water, electricity, and gas links for Kinmen and Matsu, as well as the joint use of Xiangan Airport and the construction of cross-sea bridges, goes beyond the economic realm. This is the CCP’s soft attempt at “Crimeanization.” By tethering the lifelines of the outlying islands to Fujian Province, Beijing is looking to strategically “pre-occupy” Kinmen and Matsu and move towards “integration” with Taiwan’s outlying islands in terms of daily functions before any legal “unification” occurs.

In the short term, Beijing’s ten measures are unlikely to reverse Taiwan’s efforts at trade diversification. Also, the PRC may not be able to follow through with several of the measures due to a lack of mutual trust between Beijing and the DPP government. Yet the strategic value of those measures lies not in their implementation, but in propaganda. By packaging Cheng Li-wun’s mainland visit as a “peace and prosperity dividend mission,” the Xi leadership is sowing a psychological seed within Taiwan: “Choosing the KMT brings economic development; choosing the DPP brings only the risk of war.” Beijing’s gambit will bear fruit if it manages to shift the political landscape in Taiwan closer in its favor come 2028.

3. Beijing’s “peace overture” in the Xi-Cheng talks is likely aimed as much at Washington as at Taiwan. The U.S.-Iran war is occupying much of the Trump administration’s bandwidth and is exposing U.S. vulnerabilities as the munition demands of war in the Middle East further strain America’s rare earth stockpiles. Should the war drag on, the U.S. will increasingly have to pivot away from Asia and become less able to handle security concerns in the Indo-Pacific.

By projecting an image of “stability” in his meeting with Cheng Li-wun, Xi Jinping is effectively offering President Trump a “grand bargain” of sorts: If Trump is willing to scale back U.S. security commitments to Taiwan under the banner of maintaining peace in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing may in turn ensure “stability” in supplying the U.S. with much-needed rare earths. But if the U.S. insists on supporting William Lai and the DPP, or worse, openly backs “Taiwan independence,” then Beijing could tighten the supply of critical strategic resources to the U.S. and trigger “instability” in the Taiwan Strait to keep Washington bogged down across multiple fronts. Put another way, the CCP could be pursuing the strategy “using the threat of war to force negotiations, and using the promise of peace to lure with benefits” (以戰逼談、以和誘利).

President Trump’s inclination towards transactional deal-making and the second Trump administration’s propensity to “play nice” with China could see Trump dance to Xi’s tune on Taiwan and other issues crucial to the CCP should he visit Beijing in mid-May as scheduled. If so, Xi could throw in some “sweeteners” like agricultural and airplane purchases during Trump’s scheduled visit in mid-May; no major deals are expected to emerge from the planned Xi-Trump summit. On the flipside, hawkish elements within the administration and the U.S. security establishment could prevail and advise Trump against going along too much with whatever Xi wants. This would prolong the U.S.-China “stalemate” since the Busan summit between the two leaders and Beijing will not gain any diplomatic victories.

4. CCTV’s broadcast of the drama series “Swords into Plowshares” is an example of how the CCP utilizes cultural narratives to advance strategic goals. Through the series, Beijing is attempting to draw parallels between China’s dynastic history and contemporary cross-strait relations.

“Swords into Plowshares” focuses on the historical event of Qian Chu, the king of Wuyue, “submitting his land to the Song Dynasty.” Official PRC media and some scholars seized upon the airing of the drama series to argue that Qian Chu’s decision to relinquish sovereignty in order to “preserve the people” is a “supreme moral choice.” This, however, is historical revisionism intended to indirectly “chastise” Taiwan’s political elite. Through this narrative, Beijing attempts to convey three messages: first, the “reunification” of China and Taiwan is a historical necessity, while division inevitably leads to chaotic eras where commoners are ‘devoured” as depicted in the show; second, surrendering sovereignty can bring peace, and emulating Qian Chu can preserve livelihoods and prosperity; and third, that the “Li Yu of Southern Tang” model, i.e. clinging to resistance, only invites destruction.

The Xi-Cheng meeting can therefore be seen as a real-world extension of the CCP’s revisionist historical narrative. During the meeting, Xi Jinping repeatedly referenced Sun Yat-sen, emphasizing that “revitalizing China and achieving national unification” were his lifelong goals. By invoking Sun — a shared historical symbol for both the KMT and CCP — Beijing is framing “reunification” as a matter of “national righteousness” and attempting to weaken Taiwanese society’s psychological attachment to the democratic system. This cognitive warfare is an effort to instill a sense of collective fear among the Taiwanese: Rejecting Beijing’s “peace proposal” is tantamount to rejecting a “golden age of peace” (太平盛世) and instead choosing the chaos and devastation of a fractured era (亂世浩劫).

5. The CCP may be projecting a posture of “peace” to the world (the Xi-Cheng meeting, pushing Iran to engage in ceasefire talks, etc.), but it is still making preparations for armed conflict.

Most notably, Xi Jinping has been subjecting the PLA to political rectification to ensure that it fully heeds his command during times of crisis. After the exposure of severe corruption in the PLA Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force in mid-2023, the military has been subjected to sweeping purges and structural adjustments that are still ongoing. Beijing’s emphasis on “strict political discipline” and “zero-tolerance” towards “failing to implement the Chairman Responsibility System” and “expressing incorrect political views” indicates that the CCP is orienting the PRC toward and preparing it for eventual war (向戰為戰) amid the intensification of high-stakes geopolitical competition. Concurrently, Beijing’s obsession with the military’s political loyalty hints at the possible existence of differing internal opinions regarding current strategies toward the U.S., Taiwan, and other key geopolitical questions. Regardless, the Xi leadership’s effort at readying the military for conflict reflects Beijing’s understanding that calls for peace must ultimately be backed by strong military deterrence.

Beijing’s legislative footprint also leaves signs of conflict preparation. In March 2026, the PRC implemented a new reserve personnel law that expanded the issuance of identification cards to non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. This indicates that the PRC is making preparations for long-term social mobilization in“extreme scenarios.”