1 What the ‘reappearance’ of ex-foreign minister Qin Gang entails
Qin Gang makes a reappearance?
On Oct. 19, a group photo featuring a man who looks like former PRC foreign minister Qin Gang started making the rounds on overseas Chinese social media. The man wore a dark suit and a striped red tie, spotted a much shorter haircut than the one that Qin had while in office, and looked much heavier than Qin did at his final public appearances.
Details circulating online said that the man who resembles Qin Gang had attended a concert on Oct. 17 titled, “Tracing Romance, Reaching Modern Sounds.” The concert was part of the 28th Beijing Music Festival held from Oct. 10 to Oct. 24 at the Divine Music Department in the Temple of Heaven in central Beijing.
If the man was Qin Gang, the concert event is his first public appearance since being removed from office in July 2023.
Qin’s downfall
A career diplomat, Qin Gang was appointed foreign minister in December 2022 and became a State Councilor (deputy national level) at the 2023 Two Sessions (March 12). At the time, Qin was the youngest member of the top CCP leadership.
Qin, however, had reached the pinnacle of his political career in early 2023. Starting June 25, Qin disappeared from public view and missed several major diplomatic events. Qin was removed as foreign minister on July 25, and removed as State Councilor on Oct. 24. On July 18, 2024, the 20th Central Committee approved Qin’s resignation from the Central Committee. However, official announcements about Qin Gang still referred to him as “comrade,” which indicated that he was still in good standing in the Party.
Qin Gang’s “disappearance” from public view and subsequent removal from office sparked widespread speculation. Overseas Chinese commentators claimed that Qin’s case was linked to corruption and national security breaches in the senior ranks of the People’s Liberation Army. Western media also published various accounts about what happened to Qin and his fate. In September 2023, The Wall Street Journal cited people familiar with the matter as saying that Qin was dismissed over “lifestyle issues,” including an extramarital affair that led to a child being born in the United States. In December 2023, Politico Europe published an article with no byline that claimed Qin and several top military officers had been compromised by Western intelligence agencies and that Qin had “died, either from suicide or torture” in a military hospital in July 2023.
In September 2024, the Washington Post cited two former U.S. officials as saying that Qin Gang had been assigned a low-level job at World Affairs Press, a state-owned publishing house affiliated with the PRC foreign ministry. The former officials said that Qin was demoted sometime in the spring of 2024, but he is also “off the hook.”
Backdrop
On Oct. 17, the CCP authorities announced the expulsion of nine generals, including former CMC vice chairman He Weidong and former CMC Political Work Department director Miao Hua.
Our take
1. Unless the photo is doctored, there is a good chance that the person in the dark suit who resembles Qin Gang is indeed the man himself. And if Qin had been permitted to make a somewhat prominent public appearance, then this validates much of our earlier analysis about his situation and our read of current dynamics in CCP elite politics.
We previously made the following assessments:
- Qin Gang is likely not guilty of serious wrongdoing and would be afforded a “soft landing.”
- Contrary to Politico’s reporting, it is very unlikely that Qin had died and his case has nothing to do with corruption in the military or intelligence leaks.
- Developments that led to Qin’s removal could have been an effort by “Xi Jinping’s remaining factional rivals and the ‘anti-Xi coalition,’ including elements opposed to Xi in the military or the CCP intelligence apparatus’s ‘hidden front’ (see here and here), to exploit the Xi leadership’s prioritization of national security matters to ‘manipulate’ the PRC leader into taking out his own allies and ultimately undermining his own interests.”
- Qin Gang could get off even more lightly than Xi ally and former China Securities Regulatory Commission chairman Liu Shiyu.
2. From the timing of Qin Gang’s public reappearance and the manner in which it was circulated in overseas Chinese social media, it is possible that the move was a deliberate one by the Xi leadership to divert some attention away from the purge of the nine PLA generals.
It is also possible that Xi Jinping wants to signal with Qin’s reappearance that he is firmly in charge and rebuff the claims of the “Xi losing power” camp. If Xi has truly lost control and is being ousted, then Qin would not get off on a relatively minor charge (“lifestyle issues”) and be able to enjoy a “soft landing” after being removed as foreign minister. According to some reports, Qin left office still holding on to the vice ministerial rank; if accurate, then Qin was treated less harshly than Liu Shiyu, who was demoted to the division rank. And if Qin indeed left office at the vice ministerial rank, then there is a chance that he could be tasked with engaging in semi-official or quasi-official diplomatic activities on behalf of Beijing through quasi-governmental institutions.
Furthermore, it is possible that Xi is signaling with Qin’s case that he is not removing political allies out of paranoia and continues to be a rational operator. This would assuage Xi’s allies and loyalists that he is being very selective in purging some of their numbers, and there is redemption for those who were removed because Xi’s hand was forced.
2 CCP makes propaganda push promoting Xi in the lead up to the Fourth Plenum
PRC mouthpiece Xinhua published a series of commentaries and editorials that lavish praise on Xi Jinping’s “achievements” in the lead up to the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (Oct. 20 to Oct. 23).
Oct. 20
1. Xinhua released an over 4,100 character-long commentary titled “Ensuring Decisive Progress in Basically Realizing Socialist Modernization — Written on the Occasion of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee” (over 4,100 characters). People’s Daily also republished the commentary as the lead article on its front page.
The commentary begins by discussing the “historical significance” of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021 to 2025) and the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030), the latter of which would be deliberated at the Fourth Plenum. The commentary said that the 14th Five-Year Plan, which was implemented under the leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, achieved the “first centenary goal,” while the 15th Five-Year Plan will mark the key stage in “basically realizing socialist modernization” and ensuring “decisive progress.”
The commentary then systemically reviews the accomplishments of the 14th Five-Year Plan period. This includes covering areas such as the economy, innovation, ecology, and people’s livelihood with statistics, examples, and theoretical elaborations. The commentary follows up by detailing Xi’s strategic planning for the 15th Five-Year Plan.
Throughout the commentary, Xi’s speeches during his inspection tours are quoted to illustrate how his theoretical guidance has been applied in practice, including in helping China overcome challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, external pressures, and economic slowdown. The article also credited Xi’s “incremental policy measures” for keeping China’s economy growing steadily at 5.3 percent, as well as talked up the prospects of “the future of Chinese-style modernization.”
The article also credited Xi’s “incremental policy measures” for keeping China’s economy growing steadily at 5.3 percent, as well as talked up the prospects of “the future of Chinese-style modernization.”
2. Xinhua published an editorial titled, “Writing a New Chapter of Chinese-Style Modernization through Continuous Struggle.”
The central theme of the editorial, which was around 1,900 characters long, is that the PRC — under the strong leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi at the core — should carry forward the momentum from the 14th Five-Year Plan, scientifically plan for high-quality development under the 15th Five-Year Plan, and adhere to the principles of Party leadership, people-first governance, reform and opening, and coordinated security and development.
The editorial’s conclusion quoted Xi Jinping as saying that “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable” and “the noble cause of peace and development for humanity is bound to triumph,” before proclaiming that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” has entered and “irreversible historical process” and “Chinese-style modernization is unfolding a magnificent and glorious picture.” The editorial then urged the Chinese people to “unite even more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, fully implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” and to “work tirelessly generation after generation” to “basically realize socialist modernization and advance the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Oct. 14 – Oct. 20
Xinhua published a series of commentaries praising Xi Jinping’s “great achievements.” The commentaries were organized into several themes:
i) “Review and Insights on the Practice of Economic and Social Development During the 14th Five-Year Plan”
Commentary titles include:
- “Upholding the Party’s Comprehensive Leadership to Provide a Fundamental Guarantee for High-Quality Development”
- “Adhering to a People-Centered Approach to Continuously Fulfill People’s Aspirations for a Better Life”
- “Implementing the New Development Philosophy to Promote High-Quality Growth”
- “Deepening Reform and Opening Up to Continuously Enhance Development Vitality and Momentum”
- “Promoting Democracy and Rule of Law to Consolidate the Foundation for High-Quality Development”
- “Applying Systemic Thinking to Coordinate All Aspects of the Party and the Nation’s Endeavors”
- “Advancing Self-Revolution to Guide High-Quality Development Through High-Quality Party-Building”
The core ideas that these commentaries sought to convey to CCP cadres, theorists, and the general readership include:
- The Party’s leadership and “self-revolution” are the “fundamental guarantee” and “internal driving force” of high-quality development. Adherence to these principles has ensured the achievements of the 14th Five-Year Plan despite complex domestic and international conditions.
- Development must be holistic and people-centered, emphasizing the dialectical unity of reform, innovation, and institutional improvement, while avoiding fragmented or narrow thinking.
- Using strong didactic and mobilizing messaging, the commentaries in the series called for perseverance (“upholding integrity and innovation,” “working steadily over the long term,” etc.) to ensure that the whole Party and nation approach the 15th Five-Year Plan with a systemic mindset aligned with central reform policies.
- The commentaries place special emphasis on “courage in self-revolution” as a form of internal warning and education, likely to heighten awareness of potential risks and reinforce responsibility and loyalty to safeguard the Party’s rule.
ii) “Xi Jinping Economic Thought Guides Economic Work in the New Era”
Commentary titles include:
- “Steering the Overall Direction of Development”
- “Revealing the Development Laws of the New Era”
- “Resolutely Fighting Tough and Protracted Battles”
- “Making Crucial Decisions at Critical Moments”
- “Balancing Short-Term Actions and Long-Term Vision to Shape a Bright Future”
This series expands on using “Xi Jinping Economic Thought” as a “scientific guide” and “fundamental principle” to shape the economic governance of China. It claims that Xi’s leadership has enabled “high-quality development” and “Chinese-style modernization” despite internal and external challenges. Articles in the series also tie the PRC’s economic “achievements” to border political objectives like advancing toward the 15th Five-Year Plan, promoting “common prosperity,” and contributing “China’s solutions” to global development and the “community of shared future for mankind.”
iii) “Socialism is Achieved Through Hard Work”
Commentary titles include:
- “The Great Way Is Simple — What Matters Is to Work Hard”
- “Dare to Act, and Achieve Results Through Capable Governance”
- “Leave Traces When Grasping Iron, Imprints When Stepping on Stone”
This series claims that the CCP’s “great achievements of socialism” were not gifts from heaven, but were realized through the hard work, struggle, and dedication of the entire Party and the Chinese people. It urged officials and citizens to carry forward this spirit in the new era, to forge a shared national consensus, and to inspire people to “strengthen confidence, work diligently, and handle China’s own affairs well,” and thereby advance the project of Chinese-style socialist modernization.
Our take
1. A central theme of the Xinhua commentaries and editorials published in the lead up to the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee is the promotion of Xi Jinping’s centrality to the PRC’s “achievements” over the past decade. This propaganda campaign builds on the post-Beijing parade propaganda offensive, and is likely intended to conceal the governance failures of the Xi leadership (“zero-COVID,” property sector “three red lines,” etc.), create momentum for the smooth passage of Xi’s political agenda at the Fourth Plenum, and lay the groundwork to justify Xi taking another term at the 21st Party Congress.
Beijing’s latest propaganda push is rather overt in making the case for Xi Jinping’s importance and relevance to the CCP regime and its “success.” For one, the Xinhua commentaries laud the Xi leadership for “upholding the Party’s leadership” and “guiding” the PRC with “Xi Jinping Thought,” which allowed the regime to achieve “high-quality development” and “great accomplishments” during the 14th Five-Year Plan period despite “complex domestic and international challenges.” The propaganda narrative also asserts that the 14th Five-Year Plan provides a “solid foundation” for the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan, which, in turn, requires Xi’s continued leadership and ideological guidance.
The propaganda campaign also urges the CCP officialdom and Party members to embrace Xi’s policies and do their best to implement them. To ensure the realization of “Chinese-style modernization” and the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Party members are called upon to “consciously accept Xi’s self-revolution” (i.e., his authoritarian rule and political purges) and to “consciously implement” so-called “institutional reforms” (the institutionalization of Xi’s personal dictatorship) and “deepening reform” policies. Concurrently, Party cadres and members are encouraged to “stay confident” and “work diligently” while refraining from passive resistance or “lying flat.”
The latest raft of Xinhua commentaries and editorials engages in the generation of so-called “positive energy” in painting “pie in the sky” prospects to get officials and the Chinese people on board with Xi Jinping’s agenda. For instance, the commentaries claim that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (in reality, the CCP’s exploitation of China and the Chinese people to achieve its goals) has entered an “irreversible historical process,” that “Chinese-style modernization” has a “bright and glorious future,” that “common prosperity” will soon be achieved, and that Xi’s “successful governance model” and “community of shared future for mankind” will “point the way forward for humanity.”
Paradoxically, the more intense the propaganda push gets, the more it reveals Xi Jinping’s lack of confidence in his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) and emphasizes the fact that Xi’s “quan wei” is being largely propped up by propaganda. To overcome this weakness, the Xi leadership is increasingly relying on “self-revolution” to purge corrupt and disloyal elements in the regime, as well as forcibly spur on officials who do not trust or believe in his leadership and are likely to lapse into passivity and inaction while on the job.
2. The CCP’s latest propaganda offensive claims that the PRC is doing well despite “complex domestic and international conditions.” However, a closer look indicates that the PRC is in fact not doing well.
Internationally, the PRC faces escalated trade tensions with the United States and other countries over its recent expansion of rare earth controls. While Washington and Beijing have both sent conciliatory signals and appear to be headed for a rapprochement at the time of writing, Sino-U.S. trade tensions are likely to be sustained for the long haul as both sides strive to get ahead of the other in “great power” competition. Prolonged trade tensions will hurt the PRC more than the U.S. given the former’s greater dependency on the latter and Washington’s efforts to diversify from China. For instance, even though China’s share of exports to the U.S. has fallen from 14.6 percent in the first nine months of 2024 to 11.4 percent in 2025, the absolute value of exports to the U.S. still reached $317 billion. Also, the U.S. has made critical minerals deals with Australia, Pakistan, and other countries, as well as made efforts to expand local production, to wean itself off rare earths from China.
While China’s exports to the U.S. have declined, its exports to other regions with more limited consumption capacity have increased. China’s export share to ASEAN, Hong Kong, South America, and Africa has all risen to varying degrees — from 16.2 percent, 8.1 percent, 7.9 percent, and 4.9 percent respectively in the first nine months of 2024 to 17.5 percent, 10.6 percent, 8.0 percent, and 5.9 percent in the same period in 2025. The increase in Chinese exports to the aforementioned regions could be partly due to Chinese goods being rerouted there to disguise their origin before being shipped to the United States. As U.S. customs tighten inspections to crack down on the relabeling of Chinese goods, China’s exports are likely to decline in the fourth quarter.
Domestically, China’s economy continues to show deflationary pressures and other weaknesses. The National Bureau of Statistics recently announced that China’s GDP for the first three quarters of 2025 increased 5.2 percent to 101.5 trillion yuan. By quarter, China’s GDP grew 5.4 percent, 5.2 percent, and 4.8 percent respectively. However, other indicators cast doubt on the credibility of this growth:
- In the first three quarters of 2025, fixed asset investment (excluding rural households) fell 0.5 percent to 37.2 trillion yuan and total retail sales of consumer goods grew by only 4.5 percent to 36.6 trillion yuan; the growth rate of both indicators is below the headline GDP growth rate of 5.2 percent.
- While exports remained strong (up 7.1 percent to 33.6 trillion yuan) and industrial added value grew 6.2 percent, corporate income tax revenue rose by only 0.8 percent to 3.3 trillion yuan. The strong export numbers did not translate into higher profits likely because the tax authorities strengthened tax collection from enterprises while firms sought to boost exports through low-price dumping. This is consistent with persistent deflation in industrial prices, with producer prices for industrial products down 2.8 percent and the purchasing prices for industrial producers down 3.2 percent.
- Official customs data showed that manufacturing exports rose 7.1 percent in the first three quarters of 2025, with double-digit growth in industries such as specialized equipment, automobiles, and instruments. An explanation for this surge in exports is U.S. tariff pressures accelerating the relocation of supply chains globally, causing a jump in equipment exports as manufacturers move production abroad. Put another way, China’s soaring export figures are likely temporary and cannot be sustained.