1 Xi is not ‘losing power’ if he is visiting Russia
Xi to visit Russia
May 4
PRC state media reported that Xi Jinping will visit Russia from May 7 to May 10 to participate in celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.
The Kremlin said in a statement on Telegram that Xi will meet with Russian president Vladimir Putin to discuss the development of the strategic partnership between Russia and China, as well as sign several documents.
May 7
Xi Jinping arrives in Moscow with pomp. In a speech upon arrival, Xi said that China and Russia have successfully explored a correct way for neighboring major powers to coexist and are forging a new era of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation.
Xi added that China and Russia, as major global powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, will join hands to safeguard the outcomes of the Second World War, firmly oppose hegemonism and power politics, and practice “true multilateralism.” Xi also expressed his anticipation for in-depth discussions with Putin on bilateral relations, practical cooperation, and international and regional issues of mutual concern.
Latest rumors about CCP elite politics
Rumors about Xi Jinping “losing power,” including the “purging” of the Xi camp, continue to circulate in Chinese-speaking circles. The latest include:
1. Zhang Shengmin, the secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Central Military Commission and a supposed close ally of CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia, will reportedly replace Miao Hua as director of the CMC Political Work Department. Meanwhile, CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary Wang Renhua will reportedly replace Zhang Shengmin as CMC Discipline Inspection Commission secretary.
Overseas Chinese observers speculate that the above personnel arrangement was part of Zhang Youxia’s way of further eliminating Xi’s influence.
2. Zhang Youxia allegedly now travels with a large number of guards wherever he goes and secures all his exits. Also, Zhang allegedly notifies the Central Guard Bureau every time he goes to Zhongnanhai and the military proceeds to seal off all escape routes from Zhongnanhai, with the implication being that no top-level official in Beijing will be able to escape if any harm befalls Zhang. Therefore, no one dares to move against Zhang Youxia now.
3. The Politburo allegedly issued a document on March 31 that supposedly almost completely rejects Xi Jinping’s governance over the past decade. Key points in the document include:
- There is a need to re-evaluate the grave errors of the Cultural Revolution and recognize the major turning point since the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee.
- In a section on lessons learned from the (Xi) new era, the document praises Party Central’s efforts in strengthening Party discipline, advancing poverty alleviation, and improving national governance capabilities. However, the document also clearly acknowledges that during certain periods, “deviations” occurred in areas like social governance, public discourse guidance, and economic development strategies, which had some impact on national development.
- The document said there was a need to “unswervingly advance reform and opening up in the new era,” calling it a critical choice for China’s future.
- The document refers to “Party Central” (黨中央) but does not mention Xi Jinping’s name at all. There is also no reference to the “Xi core” or his political slogans.
4. Miao Hua is reportedly being investigated because Xi Jinping allegedly tried to direct him to stage a coup and seize back control over the military from Zhang Youxia, but the attempt failed.
5. Facing a grim situation abroad and a sluggish domestic economy, some Party elders reportedly had had “enough” and collectively forced Xi Jinping to step down. The Party elders are also allegedly choosing a new CCP General Secretary and PRC premier. Some details of the claims include:
- The Party elders in question are Zeng Qinghong, Wang Qishan, and Wen Jiabao. Hu Jintao is not involved because he is suffering from poor health.
- The new Politburo Standing Committee is as follows: First vice premier Ding Xuexiang will serve as General Secretary; Shanghai Party boss Chen Jining will serve as the new premier; current premier Li Qiang will replace Zhao Leji as National People’s Congress Standing Committee chairman; and vice premier Zhang Guoqing will serve as executive vice premier.
- The new CCP leadership will adopt a collective decision-making mechanism that is markedly different from the current strongman system under Xi Jinping.
Our take
Rumors, speculation, and commentary claiming that Xi Jinping is “losing power” (失勢) have been circulating outside China since the conclusion of the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee in July 2024. Upon closer examination, we found that the developments asserted in the rumors and narratives often do not conform to how the CCP operates (including propaganda, factional struggle, and leadership succession), are based on flawed assumptions of factional politics and dynamics in the Party elite, or are substantiated through a very selective reading of official propaganda and documents. Further, we have not observed any tangible signs indicating that there is a change in Xi’s paramount position or the power structure of the Party; the continued implementation of Xi’s policies and vigorous promotion of his political doctrines are a stark refutation of the rumors that “reform-minded” Party elders or leaders are now in charge and Xi has already been sidelined.
In a previous newsletter entry, we offered several theories for why the “Xi losing power” narrative appears to have currency in overseas Chinese discourse, including Xi’s unpopularity abroad and efforts by “anti-Xi” forces to undermine his rule through influencing external information channels and shaping narratives on Xi. We also warned about the dangers and problems of buying the “Xi losing power” narrative, including reduced vigilance against the CCP threat.
Below, we debunk the latest “Xi losing power” rumors and look at more public signs indicating that Xi is still in charge.
1. Xi Jinping appears to be confident enough in his grip on power to make overseas trips. His ongoing visit to Russia aside, Xi traveled to three Southeast Asian countries in mid-April and made more than a dozen international trips in total since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022.
Xi would unlikely be risking foreign trips if his political position was truly shaky given the history of coup attempts and power grabs on communist leaders when they leave the country. In the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev’s opponents moved against him when he was vacationing in the Georgian resort town of Pitsunda in October 1967, while Mikhail Gorbachev faced an abortive coup while he was taking a weekend break at a Black Sea villa in August 1991. In Communist China, Deng Xiaoping and other “hardliners” in the Party elite reversed CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s moderate approach to a growing student movement when the latter visited North Korea in April 1989. Zhao was subsequently sidelined and the CCP authorities went ahead with the Tiananmen Square massacre.
2. The rumor suggesting that CMC vice chair Zhang Youxia is in command of the Central Guard Bureau and the security of Zhongnanhai, and that he allegedly has his own security team, does not stack with CCP operations.
Since the founding of the PRC, the Central Guard Bureau has been responsible for protecting senior Party members, their families, and important foreign dignitaries. While subordinate to the CMC Joint Staff Department, the Central Guard Bureau answers directly to the CCP General Office. Assuming there is no break in protocol, CCP General Office head and close Xi ally Cai Qi is responsible for Zhang Youxia’s security detail and the security situation at Zhongnanhai. And if there is no change in Xi Jinping’s power or the arrangement in the regime where the “Party commands the gun,” then Zhang could not possibly have his own security team or seal off the exits at Zhongnanhai. In fact, senior CCP officials like Zhang Youxia would find it virtually impossible to gather and plot against Xi without the latter finding out through Cai Qi (via the Central Guard Bureau) and nipping potential coups in the bud.
The implications for the CCP are dire indeed if the rumor is true. Crucially, this would mean that the Party is no longer in charge of the military and China is effectively being ruled by a military strongman in Zhang Youxia. Also, Zhang’s power would be at Xi’s level or higher, and no one from the Party would have the means to rein him in.
However, it is extremely implausible that Zhang Youxia wields so much “quan wei” (authority and prestige) that he has been able to completely dispose of both Xi and the CCP. Founding revolutionaries Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, or senior generals like Ye Jianying, possessed sufficient “quan wei” to sway the military to their will given their achievements during the Second World War and the Chinese civil war against the Kuomintang. But Zhang and other senior generals of this generation and younger simply lack the achievements of the founding revolutionaries, and therefore do not have corresponding levels of “quan wei.” Even if Zhang and other senior generals are deeply opposed to Xi, they do not have the personal charisma or “quan wei” to break the chain of command and rally the People’s Liberation Army to their cause. Would-be rebellious elements in the senior military leadership also have to contend with the long-term indoctrination of the troops in “Xi Jinping Thought” and Xi’s other political theories; as officers and the troops are brainwashed into viewing Xi as their ultimate authority, they will not casually break the chain of command and follow someone else.
3. The rumor that the Politburo allegedly issued a document on March 31 that supposedly almost completely rejects Xi Jinping’s governance over the past decade contains no details that explicitly back the claim. Instead, the rumored details offer insinuations at best that Xi is being criticized.
More crucially, the rumor is not backed by concrete developments. The CCP authorities have been implementing Xi’s policies and promoting his political ideologies more than a month after the supposed issue of the Politburo document, and there is no change in the current leadership model.
4. The rumor that a triumvirate of Party elders has collectively forced Xi Jinping to step down does not hold water given current and previous developments.
We have already indicated above that the Xi-controlled Central Guard Bureau has an eye on all senior CCP officials. This leaves all Party elders with little opportunity, if at all, to conspire against Xi, especially something of the magnitude of replacing him and reshuffling his leadership team.
We have also observed in numerous past newsletters that official propaganda about Xi Jinping has not changed. If Xi were indeed replaced, the first signs would be a drastic shift in CCP propaganda about him and the abandonment of Xi’s policies. After all, the whole premise of “Xi losing power” is that his policies are terrible for China and the regime’s stability is threatened; there is no reason for supposedly “reform-minded” Party elders to remove Xi but risk running the regime into the ground by keeping his policies.
Finally, the remaining Party elders in the regime and their allies had not been able to prevent Xi Jinping from taking a third term at the 20th Party Congress, or getting his way on what appears to be the bulk of personnel appointments. With Xi having consolidated power to an even greater degree now, they are even less capable of influencing his leadership from within the CCP system. That being said, “anti-Xi” forces appear to still be hard at work undermining the Xi leadership from outside China, notably by swaying the public discourse about Xi’s political position.
5. The reshuffling or purging of officials who are considered to be Xi Jinping’s allies or loyalists cannot be taken in and of itself as evidence that Xi is “losing power.” Notably, both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping replaced many allies and loyalists when they were paramount with little to no impact on their political position. For instance:
Purge of key Mao allies
- Gao Gang: Former CCP Northeast Bureau leader and one of the main executors of Mao’s Yan’an Rectification Movement. After the rectification, Mao promoted Gao to the Politburo in 1945. Following the establishment of the PRC, Mao further elevated Gao to PRC vice chairman and chairman of the State Planning Commission, as well as had him oversee eight major industrial ministries under the State Council, thereby curtailing the power of premier Zhou Enlai. However, Mao sacrificed Gao in high-level power struggles, removing him from office in 1954. Gao later committed suicide.
- Liu Shaoqi: Former Central Vice Chairman and PRC president. Before the founding of the PRC, Liu worked with Mao in intra-Party factional struggles and helped to elevate Mao to godlike status with the CCP. Liu was also a key figure in Mao’s Yan’an Rectification Movement. Mao elevated Liu from the 1940s, designating him as the CCP’s “standard bearer of holding high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought.” However, Mao accused Liu of being a “capitalist roader” at the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Liu would die from persecution in 1969.
- Lin Biao: Former PRC Marshal. Mao designated Lin as his “successor” in the 1960s, but Lin was later accused of treason in 1971 after a “defection” incident. Lin died in a plane crash.
Purge of Deng’s allies
- Hu Yaobang: Promoted by Deng to CCP General Secretary in 1978, and helped to advance reform and opening-up policies. Criticized by conservatives in 1986 for tolerating “bourgeois liberalization” (e.g., student movements), removed in 1987 with Deng’s acquiescence, and retained nominal Politburo status.
- Zhao Ziyang: Promoted by Deng to PRC premier in 1980 and CCP General Secretary in 1987. While Zhao championed market reforms, he later opposed imposing martial law during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and clashed with Deng. Zhao was later removed and placed under house arrest until his death in 2005.
Xi is likely to reshuffle or purge even more officials who are considered to be his “allies” or “loyalists” (whether they really are is questionable in some cases) given the uncovering of serious corruption in the military in 2023 with the scandal involving the PLA Rocket Force and military logistics departments. Growing paranoia and suspicion of “two-faced” officials could lead Xi to suspect even those who were “trusted allies” and approve investigations into them. Such probes and reshuffles, however, are not necessarily signs that Xi’s political position is somehow threatened or that he has already been marginalized.