1 Xi hammers home his primacy in the regime ahead of new year
Xi emphasizes paramount position
Honoring retired cadres
Jan. 17
The Central Military Commission held a Chinese New Year cultural performance in Beijing to honor retired military cadres based in Beijing. Xi Jinping, as well as four active and six former members of the CMC, attended the event.
Per official media reports of the event, the retired military cadres unanimously expressed their commitment to closely uniting around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, adhering to Xi Jinping Thought, thoroughly implementing Xi’s vision of a strong military, deeply understanding the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” resolutely upholding the “Two Safeguards,” and implementing the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
Politburo meeting
Jan. 20
Xi Jinping presided over a Politburo meeting that reviewed the “Comprehensive Report on the 2024 Work Summaries and 2025 Work Plans of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.” (中央政治局常委會聽取並研究全國人大常委會、國務院、全國政協、最高人民法院、最高人民檢察院黨組工作匯報和中央書記處工作報告的綜合情況報告).
The meeting fully acknowledged the work of the five Party leadership groups and the Central Secretariat in 2024 and affirmed their work arrangements for 2025. The meeting also emphasized that in 2024, these groups adhered to Xi Jinping Thought, firmly upheld the “quan wei” and centralized leadership of Party Central, strengthened their internal Party building, and diligently fulfilled their primary responsibility of enforcing strict governance of the Party. Additionally, the Central Secretariat was commended for its active and effective role in carrying out significant tasks.
The meeting stressed that in the new year, the five Party leadership groups must continue to be guided by Xi Jinping Thought, uphold Party Central’s centralized and unified leadership as the highest political principle, and ensure unity of thought, alignment in direction, and strict adherence to orders. These groups are also expected to demonstrate new responsibilities and achievements in advancing Chinese-style modernization. The meeting tasked the Central Secretariat with completing the assignments entrusted to it by Party Central with high quality.
CNY gathering with non-Party representatives
Jan. 20
Xi Jinping hosted a Chinese New Year gathering at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing with leaders of central committees of all democratic parties, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), and representatives of non-CCP individuals. The event was attended by Politburo Standing Committee members Wang Huning and Cai Qi, vice chairman of the CPPCC Shi Taifeng, as well as leaders from democratic parties, the ACFIC, and relevant central departments.
Cai Dafeng, chairman of the central committee of the China Association for Promoting Democracy, delivered a speech on behalf of the democratic parties, the ACFIC, and non-Party individuals at the event. He noted that significant and hard-won achievements were made in reform and development in 2024 under the leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core. Cai also urged all democratic parties, the ACFIC, and non-Party individuals to maintain a high degree of alignment with Party Central in the new year.
After Cai’s remarks, Xi delivered an important speech where he underscored the achievements of his leadership in 2024:
- The Xi leadership successfully implemented existing policies and introduced a package of new policies, leading to economic recovery and GDP growth of 5 percent.
- The Xi leadership maintained social stability while balancing development and security.
- The Xi leadership advanced great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, as well as contributed positive energy to global peace, stability, and human progress.
- The Xi leadership conducted rigorous education on Party discipline, upheld anti-corruption efforts, and improved Party and government conduct.
Xi noted that 2024 was a year of “steady innovation” and “robust development” in the cause of multi-party cooperation. He added that democratic parties and non-Party individuals actively contributed to the CCP’s implementation decisions and deployments, while the ACFIC facilitated policies to support and grow the private economy. Xi expressed thanks to those groups on behalf of Party Central.
Xi then outlined three expectations for the democratic parties, the ACFIC, and non-Party individuals:
- Firmly uphold the fundamental characteristics of China’s new political party system under the leadership of the CCP, and deeply study Xi Jinping Thought.
- Closely follow the central work and actively contribute ideas and efforts.
- Highlight political leadership and consolidate the development of a positive political environment.
Xi ‘inconsistent’?
In reviewing Xi Jinping’s latest speeches and events, some overseas Chinese commentators have argued that the CCP is displaying “inconsistencies” in how the General Secretary is regarded. Those commentators say that the Jan. 9 Politburo Standing Committee meeting’s call to “adhere to the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central,” the retired military cadres’ declaration to “closely unite around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” and the Jan. 20 Politburo meeting’s exhortation to “uphold Party Central’s centralized and unified leadership as the highest political principle” stand in stark contrast to PLA Daily’s promotion of “democratic centralism” and the “collective leadership” in a series of commentaries in December 2024.
The commentators suggest that the “inconsistencies” reflect the Xi leadership’s lack of confidence and potentially signal Xi Jinping gradual loss of control over the regime.
Our take
The language used in recent high-level CCP meetings and other social events is in line with that used by the propaganda system in years past and indicates that Xi Jinping’s paramount position and political status in the regime has not changed. In particular, propaganda outlets continue to emphasize the “centralized and unified leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” highlight CCP and non-Party members being guided by Xi’s political theories, and laud Xi for his “accomplishments.” Such language would be noticeably altered or absent if Xi had indeed “lost power” or “lost control of authority” as some overseas Chinese commentators and media outlets have been asserting since the second half of 2024.
We believe that the overseas Chinese commentators who perceive “inconsistencies” in the CCP’s messaging regarding Xi’s political position likely had fundamentally flawed assumptions about Xi’s health and his grip on power (see here and here) to begin with. Those commentators also appear to lack understanding about the differences in CCP propaganda targeting various levels of the Party and the regime, an issue that led to a misinterpretation of what the commentaries about “democratic centralism” published in the PLA Daily in December 2024 actually entailed.
The persistent misunderstandings about Xi’s political status could be due to a general lack of knowledge about how the CCP actually operates in the overseas Chinese-speaking community, the work of “anti-Xi” elements who are looking to sow disinformation abroad in the hopes of influencing matters on the mainland, or a mix of both. Regardless, this reflects Xi Jinping’s growing unpopularity both at home and abroad as his various governance failures compound. The misinterpretations of Xi’s political status are unlikely to affect his “quan wei” or seriously affect his rule as long as his paramount position is intact and he retains firm control over the military and public security forces.
2 How the CCP views Trump’s return to the White House
Trump’s day one China-related actions
1. Donald Trump was sworn-in as the 47th president of the United States on Jan. 20. After his inauguration, Trump signed 26 executive orders dealing with a range of topics. Orders concerning the PRC include:
i) “America First Trade Policy”
Under the section on “Economic and Trade Relations with the People’s Republic of China,” the executive order tasks:
- The United States Trade Representative with reviewing the economic and trade agreement between the U.S. government and the PRC government to determine the latter’s compliance, and recommend actions based on the review findings “up to and including the imposition of tariffs or other measures as needed.”
- The USTR with assessing a report reviewing actions taken in Section 301 investigations into China and make recommendations as necessary to “remediate any issues identified in connection with this process.”
- The USTR with investigating “other acts, policies, and practices by the PRC that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may burden or restrict United States commerce,” and made recommendations on appropriate responsive actions.
- The USTR and commerce secretary with assessing legislative proposals concerning the United States’ Permanent Normal Trade Relations with the PRC and making recommendations on proposed changes to the legislative proposals.
- The commerce secretary with assessing the status of U.S. intellectual property rights conferred upon PRC persons, and making recommendations to ensure “reciprocal and balanced treatment of intellectual property rights with the PRC.”
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Legacy Western media outlets and commentators framed Trump’s executive order as him “unexpectedly” refraining from “immediately” imposing tariffs on China. However, Trump did not previously say that he planned to tariff China on day one of his return to office.
ii) “Application of protecting Americans from foreign adversary controlled applications act to TikTok”
The executive order seeks to extend the deadline when the TikTok divest-or-ban law goes into effect by 75 days.
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Speaking to reporters when signing the order, Trump said he believed the PRC will “ultimately” approve a deal to sell TikTok because “we’d put tariffs on China.” He added, “Maybe, I’m not saying I would, but you certainly could do that. And if we said, well, ‘you’re not going to approve it,’ then that’s a certain hostility, and we’ll put tariffs of 25, 30, 40, 50 percent, even 100 percent.”
In a Jan. 19 post on Truth Social, Trump wrote, “I would like the United States to have a 50 percent ownership position in a joint venture. By doing this, we save TikTok, keep it in good hands and allow it to stay up. Without U.S. approval, there is no TikTok. With our approval, it is worth hundreds of billions of dollars – maybe trillions.”
When asked about Trump’s threat to levy 100 percent tariffs on China over the TikTok deal during a regular PRC foreign ministry press conference, foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said, “When it comes to actions such as the operation and acquisition of businesses, we believe they should be independently decided by companies in accordance with market principles. If it involves Chinese companies, China’s laws and regulations should be observed.”
iii) “Withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization”
The executive order announced the U.S. intention to withdraw from the WHO. The order noted that the U.S. noticed its withdrawal from the organization in 2020 due to its mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic that came from Wuhan and other global health crises, its “failure to adopt urgently needed reforms,” and its “inability to demonstrate independence from the inappropriate political influence of WHO member states.” The order further noted that the WHO continues to demand “unfairly onerous payments” from the U.S. while China, which has 300 percent of the population of the U.S., “contributes nearly 90 percent less” to the organization.
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The CCP has long been known to influence the WHO.
2. In an event at the White House on Jan. 21, Trump said he was considering imposing a tariff of 10 percent on Chinese imports on Feb. 1 “based on the fact that they’re sending fentanyl to Mexico and Canada.”
Trump added, “Other countries are big abusers also, you know it’s not just China. We have a $350 billion deficit with the European Union. They treat us very very badly, so they’re going to be in for tariffs.”
PRC stays ‘neutral’ on Trump coverage
PRC state media issued very brief reports of President Trump’s inauguration and flurry of executive actions. The reports heavily summarized and followed the angle of how Western mainstream media covered Trump’s return to the White House, and did not mention Trump’s call for federal agencies to review Sino-U.S. trade matters and recommend actions.
PRC foreign ministry spokespersons also repeated that China “stands ready to work with the new government of the U.S.” on the basis of “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.” They also avoided “wolf warrior” language in replying U.S.-specific questions from reporters and adopted neutral, diplomatic rhetoric.
Trump-Xi call
Xi Jinping and Donald Trump had a phone call on Jan. 17.
In a post on Truth Social, Trump wrote that the call was a “very good one for both China and the U.S.A.” and he expected them to “solve many problems together, and starting immediately.” Trump added that they discussed “balancing trade, fentanyl, TikTok, and many other subjects” and that he and Xi would “do everything possible to make the world more peaceful and safe.”
According to a Xinhua readout of the call, Xi congratulated Trump on his re-election and hoped that Sino-U.S. relations “will have a good start in the new U.S. presidential term.” Xi added that the two countries “share extensive common interests and broad space for cooperation,” but also have “some differences.” He urged both sides to “do more great, practical, and good things that are conducive to the two countries and the world at large based on the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation” so that the “two giant ships of China and the United States move forward on the course of stable, healthy, and sustainable development.” Xi also cautioned the U.S. on its handling of the Taiwan issue.
Per the Xinhua readout, Trump said he “cherishes his great relationship with Xi, hopes to continue to maintain dialogue and communication, and looks forward to meeting Xi at an early date.” The Wall Street Journal reported on Jan. 18 that Trump told his advisers that he wants to travel to China in his first 100 days in office, citing people familiar with the matter. People close to Beijing’s decision-making also said that Trump and Xi had discussed meeting in person through their representatives, with an option involving Trump inviting Xi to the United States.
Big picture
President Trump expressed dissatisfaction towards the PRC on numerous occasions on the campaign trail and his fondness for tariffs in general.
In an interview on Fox News in December 2024, Trump said that he had a “great relationship” with Xi Jinping during his first term, and “I really believe he liked me and I liked him.” Trump added that Xi is a “killer” but “I had a great relationship with him.”
Meanwhile, Xi said in his final meeting with former president Joe Biden at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru that he would work with the Trump administration to “maintain communication, expand cooperation, and manage differences.”
Our take
1. Xi Jinping and the CCP have attempted to present to the second Trump administration a PRC that wants to cooperate with the U.S. and does not want to be provocative. However, a review of speeches by Xi and senior CCP officials, internal directives to officials, and Xi’s phone call with Russian leader Vladimir Putin indicate that the PRC has not shifted ideologically or from its antagonistic stance towards the United States.
‘Not abandoning fundamental principles’
On Jan. 16, CCP Central Committee ideological journal Qiushi published Xi’s remarks at a seminar for provincial and ministerial-level leading cadres on studying and implementing the spirit of the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee.
In his remarks, Xi repeatedly stressed that the PRC should not abandon its communist system while undertaking reform. For instance:
- Reform must “adhere to the principles of upholding integrity while innovating, avoiding both the closed and rigid path of the past and the erroneous path of abandoning core principles.”
- Reform must “align with the overarching goal of improving and developing the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”
- Reform “does not mean abandoning our fundamental principles” (改革不是改旗易格). “Upholding the Party’s comprehensive leadership, adhering to Marxism, staying true to socialism with Chinese characteristics, and maintaining the people’s democratic dictatorship — all with the aim of promoting social fairness, justice, and enhancing the people’s well-being — are foundational, directional, and long-term concerns. These principles reflect the Party’s nature and mission, align with China’s national realities, and serve the fundamental interests of the people. They must never waver under any circumstances … Guided by these overarching goals, we must resolutely reform what needs to be reformed while leaving untouched what should not be changed.”
‘Changes unseen in a century’
On Jan. 15, the Central Party School held a graduation ceremony for the officials who attended the fall semester in 2024. According to a Xinhua report, the 1,204 graduates were said to have attained a “deeper understanding of the ‘Two Establishes,’” along with other Xi political theories.
The Two Establishes, as explained by Central Party History and Documentation Research Institute dean Qu Qingshan in a nearly 12,000-character article published in July 2022, is partly a response to the CCP’s “urgent need to deal with great changes in the world unseen in a century” and to “prevent and respond to various risks and challenges.” Qu noted that the “strategic game” between the U.S. and China is a “struggle between two social systems and two ideologies,” and argued in Party-speak that the U.S.-led world order is making way for a CCP-led world order while CCP-dominated “multipolarism” is replacing U.S. global hegemony.
On Jan. 21, PRC vice premier Ding Xuexiang spoke at the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos. Ding noted that “transformation not seen in a century is accelerating across the world. With imminent tariff wars and trade wars, an ongoing tug of war between the forces for and against economic globalization, and intense rivalry between multilateralism and unilateralism, the global governance system is undergoing profound adjustments.”
Xi-Putin meeting
On Jan. 21, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin spoke via video conference. According to a PRC foreign ministry readout:
- Xi expressed his “readiness to work with President Putin and guide China-Russia relations to a new height in 2025, to respond to external uncertainties with the stability and resilience of China-Russia ties, to boost the development and prosperity of both countries, and to uphold international fairness and justice.”
- Xi said there was a need for both countries to “deepen strategic coordination, firmly support each other, and defend their legitimate interests.”
- Putin said Russia and China “always trust each other, support each other, and treat each other as equals, and that the bilateral cooperation, which serves the interests of both peoples, has remained impervious to shifts in the international landscape.”
- Putin said that Russia will work with China to “strengthen cooperation in multilateral affairs and play a positive role for world peace and development.”
The developments above suggest that the PRC plans to keep “delaying and waiting for change” (以拖待變) in the hope that the U.S. fails to overcome its crises and vacates the position of global hegemon to the CCP. With Xi and the CCP sticking firmly to their guns and Trump poised to carry out his “America First” agenda, Sino-U.S. tensions are unlikely to alleviate in the long run even if signs of “thawing” surface as the second Trump administration and Beijing re-establish diplomatic communications early in 2025. If anything, Xi and the CCP’s unwillingness to deviate from communism and embrace liberal economic and political reforms sets the stage for escalated competition with the United States going forward.
2. President Donald Trump did not pledge to impose tariffs on China on his first day of office and it is therefore unsurprising that he did not take such action. However, Trump did get the China tariff implementation process rolling with his executive order for federal agencies to review America’s economic and trade relations with the PRC, and later said he would consider imposing a 10 percent tariff on Chinese goods in February. It is likely that Trump will use tariffs as a bargaining chip to bring the PRC to the negotiation table and attempt to extract concessions.
Xi and the CCP’s attitude towards the U.S. suggests that it is only a matter of time before Trump orders sweeping new China tariffs. But Trump likely did not impose sweeping tariffs due to several factors:
- U.S. federal agencies require time to properly implement Trump’s executive order and come up with appropriate actions.
- Trump needs time to re-establish diplomatic communications with the PRC and conduct negotiations to see if it is possible to reach a deal with Beijing on various issues of U.S. interest, including TikTok.
- Trump needs time to have an in-person meeting with Xi Jinping to reassess their relationship and determine whether or not they can truly work together to resolve critical matters like the flow of fentanyl to the U.S., the migrant crisis, and the Russian-Ukraine conflict.
- Trump needs time to get allies and partner nations on the same page with the United States on dealing with the PRC and other issues.
- Trump needs to give the market time to digest the prospect of new China tariffs to preserve U.S. economic stability and manage inflation expectations.
What’s next
Xi and the CCP will likely try to gauge if President Trump is more transactional than ideological (“America First”) in his dealings before deciding the extent to which they are willing to “concede” and “compromise” to the United States.
If Trump is seen to be more transactional than ideological, Beijing will throw out bones to Washington every so often without actually making concessions as it looks to wait out the next four years. But if Trump proves less transactional and more dogmatic in “making America great again,” then Xi and the CCP would believe that there is little basis for negotiation and more nakedly play hardball with the U.S. in “great power” competition.