Various political developments in China between the end of December 2023 and early January 2024 indicate that Xi Jinping faces even greater political risks in the new year.
1 Xi compels senior officials to display loyalty, uses Mao’s legacy to absolve himself of failures
Xi Jinping conducted political mobilization during several key meetings between the end of December 2023 and early 2024.
Politburo meetings
Dec. 21 to Dec. 22
State mouthpiece Xinhua reported that the CCP Politburo held a special democratic life meeting on the theme of studying and implementing “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”
The meeting said that the Xi leadership had “successfully achieved the main expected goals of economic and social development” for 2023, and that these achievements were “hard-won and remarkable,” according to Xinhua. Members of the Politburo also “unanimously believed” that the “Two Establishes” held “decisive significance” in helping the regime deal with various risks and challenges over the past year, and that the work plan for 2024 should be guided by “Xi Jinping Thought.”
Xinhua reported that “relevant parties” made “careful preparations” before the meeting. The members of the Politburo had “heart-to-heart talks” with “relevant responsible comrades,” “listened to opinions and suggestions” from the “relevant responsible comrades,” and drafted outlines of their statements for the meeting. During the meeting, each of the Politburo members delivered statements where they “seriously investigated and deeply analyzed” whether their performance complied with regulations that Xi formulated after coming to power and met the meeting’s “expected results.” Xinhua also reported that Xi reviewed, made requests to, and summarized each of the Politburo members’ statements, and described the process as a “political physical examination” that achieved the purpose of “cleaning up political dust and purifying the political soul.”
Xinhua said that Xi delivered a speech at the meeting. Notable parts of the speech include:
- Xi urged Politburo members to “maintain a high degree of political and operational consistency with Party Central,” as well as “uphold the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central” by putting into practice the firm adherence of Party Central’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) and implementing with practical actions Xi’s various political theories (“Two Establishes,” “four consciousness,” “four self-confidences,” “Two Safeguards,” etc.).
- Xi called on Politburo members to take the lead in participating in Party Central’s study of major decisions by “thinking carefully and expressing their views fully.” Politburo members should also “reflect the actual situation learned in the course of their work in a timely, objective, and comprehensive manner,” and should not “report only the good news without reporting the bad.”
- Xi requested that Politburo members become “good at analyzing developments and trends in situations from a political perspective,” as well as “accurately identify the times and trends, dangers and opportunities, advantages and disadvantages, and proactively identify and respond to changes” so as to “accurately seize opportunities, effectively respond to risks, and plan ahead before taking action.” When dealing with conflicts and problems, Politburo members must focus on “preventing and defusing political risks,” and “promptly eliminate all kinds of hidden political risks, attach great importance to and promptly block the transformation channels of risks in different areas, and prevent non-political risks from transforming into political risks.”
- Xi stressed that Politburo members must “adhere to high-quality development” and oppose “chasing the big and foreign (貪大求洋)” and reckless behavior (盲目蠻幹); adhere to making “practical efforts to achieve practical results” and oppose the use of “flashy and falsified data”; and adhere to laying the foundation to reap long-term benefits and oppose squandering benefits and wasting resources to the detriment of the people and the public.
- Xi called for “mobilizing all positive factors that can be mobilized and uniting all forces that can be united.” He also emphasized that “the Party’s greatest political advantage is its close ties with the masses, and its greatest danger after taking power is separation from the masses.”
- Xi urged Politburo members to have “courage to carry out self-revolution” and to strictly manage “family members, relatives, and their staff.”
Jan. 4
Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee where he listened to work reports from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Central Secretariat.
The meeting said that five Party Groups and Central Secretariat, which were guided by “Xi Jinping Thought” since the 20th Party Congress, had firmly safeguarded the “quan wei and centralized and unified leadership of Party Central” and had achieved new results in all aspects of work. The meeting also urged those Party organizations to persist in safeguarding Xi Jinping and his various political theories in 2024.
Mao tribute
Dec. 26
Xi Jinping attended a symposium to mark Mao Zedong’s 130th birthday and delivered a speech. Notable parts of the nearly 8,500-character speech include:
- Nearly half of Xi’s speech focused on praising Mao’s contribution to establishing a socialist system based on Marxism.
- Xi acknowledged that Mao made a serious mistake in launching the Cultural Revolution, but attempted to absolve Mao by adding that “socialism is an entirely new endeavor in the history of mankind” and “there was no ready-made experience to draw on, and it is difficult to completely avoid all kinds of twists, turns, and mistakes on the way forward.” Xi added that the CCP had made a comprehensive evaluation of Mao’s historical merits and demerits, with Mao’s “merits coming first and mistakes coming second.” Xi even claimed that Mao’s mistakes were the mistakes of a “great revolutionary and a great Marxist.”
- Xi said that the CCP had resolved the problem of how to “correctly evaluate” the historical status of Mao Zedong and his ideological theories (i.e. class struggle and the elimination of private ownership and the bourgeoisie) and the “socialist modernization” of the post-Mao era (i.e. abandoning class struggle and allowing private ownership and a middle class) to ensure that the two are not contradictory. Xi added that the CCP had successfully advanced and expanded “Chinese-style modernization” on the aforementioned basis after the 18th Party Congress.
- Xi said that the best way to commemorate Mao is to promote “Chinese-style modernization,” the “new journey,” “national rejuvenation,” “strict governance of the Party,” and the “community of shared future for mankind” (i.e. Xi’s political thought associated with his “Sinicized Marxism” for modern times), as well as realize the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.
Our take
1. The Xinhua report of the Politburo democratic life meeting from Dec. 21 to Dec. 22 indicates that its purpose was political mobilization to assert Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” over the CCP leadership and have senior Party officials publicly pledge their fealty to Xi. This in turn suggests that while Xi has consolidated power to a very high degree, he still senses that a political crisis is just around the corner and is skeptical that senior cadres are truly loyal to him.
Xi’s continued efforts at political mobilization also show that Beijing is still attempting to resolve the problem of “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai” and other governance issues stemming from the deficiencies of the CCP authoritarian dictatorship, but is struggling to make headway. Xi wants to improve the PRC authorities’ governing efficiency to prevent the transformation of public risks and non-political risks into political risks, and defuse the growing regime crisis. However, we believe that Xi will not be successful in this endeavor and will only see his political risks worsen given the pernicious nature of Party culture and the various drawbacks of the CCP political system.
2. The Xinhua report of the democratic life meeting noted that “relevant parties” had made “careful preparations” before the meeting and engaged in “heart-to-heart talks” with the meeting attendees. This phrasing suggests that the “relevant parties” and “relevant responsible comrades” in question have been imbued with greater authority than regular Politburo members to allow them to review the performance of their peers and their subordinates and get them in line with the “expected results” of the meeting. We believe that the “relevant parties” and the “relevant responsible comrades” likely belong to the Central Leading Group for Studying and Implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (中央學習貫徹習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想主題教育領導小組) and its leadership group, including group leader Cai Qi (fifth rank Politburo Standing Committee member and Xi ally) and executive deputy group leader Li Ganjie (Politburo member).
Meanwhile, Xi subjecting members of the Politburo to a “political physical examination” indicates that he is still not confident that the members of his current leadership team are fully loyal to him. We previously analyzed that Xi loyalists and technocrats make up the bulk of the members of the 20th Politburo, with Zhao Leji and Wang Huning being the two most notable senior officials associated with the Jiang Zemin faction.
Xi likely believes that some members of his leadership team have not “maintained a high degree of political and operational consistency with Party Central” and have not implemented sufficient “practical actions” to safeguard Xi’s “quan wei” (i.e. adhering to Xi’s various political theories). Therefore, Xi has to constantly expose his leadership team to political mobilization to “clean up political dust and purify the political soul.”
3. The Xinhua report of the democratic life meeting contains Xi’s subtle criticism of the performance of his leadership team. For instance, Xi’s call for Politburo members to “think carefully and express their views fully” suggests that the latter dared not raise objections to Xi, but instead echoed and touted Xi’s decisions while sticking to the CCP’s usual bad working practices. This is further hinted at from Xi urging Politburo members not to report only the good news and not the bad, and his call for them to oppose “flashy and falsified data.” Xi likely believes that senior officials defaulting to Party culture in carrying out their duties and the lack of “timely, objective, and comprehensive” feedback likely contributed to Beijing’s many governance failures (lackluster post-COVID economic recovery, worsening property sector crisis, etc.) since the 20th Party Congress.
Xi has also recognized that the CCP is in danger of losing its political legitimacy should his leadership continue to underperform. This is seen from Xi’s warning that “the Party’s greatest political advantage is its close ties with the masses, and its greatest danger after taking power is separation from the masses.” Therefore, Xi requested that Politburo members “mobilize all positive factors that can be mobilized and unite all forces that can be united,” as well as “attach great importance to and promptly block the transformation channels of risks in different areas, and prevent non-political risks from transforming into political risks.”
4. Xi’s speech commemorating Mao Zedong appeared to be another attempt by the former to boost his political status and “quan wei” by associating himself with the Chairman. This is seen from Xi setting up his so-called “Chinese-style modernization” as the evolution of Mao’s “proletarian revolution” and Deng’s “reform and opening up,” and call to best commemorate Mao by promoting his own political theories and policies.
Additionally, in absolving Mao of blame for his mistakes, Xi attempted to find excuses for his own failures in governance. First, Xi resorts to the cliched and debunked “socialism is an unprecedented experiment and therefore failures should be tolerated” argument by claiming that “socialism is an entirely new endeavor in the history of mankind” and “it is difficult to completely avoid all kinds of twists, turns, and mistakes on the way forward.” As the inheritor of Mao’s “revolution,” Xi wants the Party and the Chinese public to believe that his “merits come first and mistakes come second,” and that his mistakes are also those of a “great revolutionary and a great Marxist.”
Xi’s effort to further associate himself with Mao, however, is likely to further alienate him from those in the Party (especially those in the CCP elite; see the second item in this newsletter) who reject or are wary of Mao’s disastrous legacy. Xi’s propaganda play, while “politically correct,” will also fail to endear himself to the Chinese people, many of whom fear the return of a strongman dictator and calamitous political campaigns.
2 Xi turns to propaganda as opposition to his rule mounts
Xi’s New Year speech
Dec. 31
Xi Jinping delivered his annual new year speech. Notable points in in Xi’s message for 2024 include:
- Xi touted his leadership’s “achievements” in 2023, claiming that the CCP had “very solidly,” “very powerfully,” “very energetically,” and “very confidently” made progress in a number of areas (including the economy, scientific and technological development, people’s livelihood, cultural inheritance, etc.).
- With regard to diplomacy, Xi claimed that China had “actively embraced the world and assumed the responsibilities of a great power.” He added that he had “shared China’s propositions and deepened mutual consensus” during his trips abroad.
- Xi downplayed the failures of his leadership by claiming that “it is normal to have ups and downs.” He acknowledged that “some companies are facing operating pressures, some people are encountering difficulties in employment and life, and natural disasters such as floods, typhoons, and earthquakes have occurred in some places.” Xi added that he is concerned with the aforementioned issues and that “the people will always be our (the CCP) biggest support in overcoming all difficulties and challenges.”
- In looking to 2024, Xi said that he will advance “Chinese-style modernization,” comprehensively deepen “reform and opening up,” and continue to support the integration of Hong Kong and Macau into China’s overall development.
- With regard to cross-strait issues, Xi said that the “reunification of the motherland is a historical necessity.” Xi did not mention “peaceful reunification” or “not using force” in achieving “reunification” with Taiwan.
- Xi claimed that his goal of governance is helping the Chinese people live a good life.
Mainland media commentary
Dec. 30
Caixin published a “farewell to 2023” article featuring prominent figures in China and abroad who passed away that year, including former PRC premier Li Keqiang, SARS outbreak whistleblower Jiang Yanyong, China’s first AIDS prevention activist and expert Gao Yaojie, and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The article was subsequently deleted, likely because it featured people whom the CCP authorities deemed to be sensitive.
***
Caixin previously published an editorial on Nov. 6, 2023 that obliquely championed Li Keqiang’s promotion of reform when he was serving in the Xi leadership after the latter died on Oct. 27.
On Dec. 25, or a day before the CCP commemorated Mao’s 130th birthday, Caixin published an editorial titled, “Revisiting the Ideological Line of Seeking Truth From Facts” (重溫實事求是思想路線). The editorial featured Deng Xiaoping’s remark that the success of “reform and opening up” was “not because we relied on books, but because we relied on practice and in seeking truth from facts.” The editorial also quoted Xi Jinping as saying, “If you go against seeking truth from facts, you will harm the Party and the country.”
Jan. 4
Mainland media Yicai published an editorial titled, “The Best Commitment is Letting Go and Delegating Power” (最好的承諾是放手和放權).
The editorial argued that “activating the private economy” is key to rescuing the Chinese economy (“getting out of the fog and climbing over hurdles”) and allowing the CCP authorities to resolve problems (shrinking demand, supply shocks, weakening expectations, weakening currency, tightening credit, etc.) facing the economy posed by the complex and changing internal and external environment. The editorial added, however, that private enterprises have not benefited from the authorities’ many policies to encourage and support the private economy.
The editorial believed that “restricting and framing the boundaries of the exercise of power” is “key to transforming the benefits [of government policies] for private capital.” The editorial added that the CCP authorities should just “exercise power in the public domain,” account for public opinion in legislation, and “let policies and so on become a game of different interests and pros and cons” so that policies can become “credible consensus” that is recognized by all parties. The editorial also said that the PRC’s 45 years of “reform and opening up” had demonstrated that the regime’s “history of economic take-off is a history of government decentralization and the independent expansion of rights.”
In concluding, the editorial said, “The best support and encouragement for the private economy is believing that entrepreneurs know how to run a business. Letting go [of government control] means letting go, and delegating power is being brave. Only in this way will state-owned enterprises dare to do [their work well], private enterprises will dare to make breakthroughs, and foreign enterprises will dare to invest [in China].”
Political rumors
End of December 2023 to early January 2024
Political rumors unfavorable to Xi Jinping have been circulating, including:
- The alleged defection of PRC deputy permanent representative to the UN Geng Shuang and his wife.
- The alleged resignation of PRC premier Li Qiang.
- The alleged arrest of former PRC vice premier Liu He.
- “Second generation reds” allegedly plotting to remove Xi and change the regime’s political system (see below).
Jan. 3
Yuan Hongbing, an Australia-based Chinese dissident and jurist, published a piece in Taiwanese media Liberty Times titled, “How Severe Political Crisis in the CCP Affects the Situation in Taiwan” (中共嚴峻政治危機, 如何影響台灣局勢).
Yuan said that Party insiders told him that a group of “second generation reds” led by Liu Yuan (the son of Liu Shaoqi) had reached a three-point political consensus to criticize Xi Jinping and shift the regime towards a parliamentary system. The three points include:
- Accuse Xi of completely betraying Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” line and regressing to the Cultural Revolution line during his decade in office. The most serious accusation to be made against Xi is that the latter is allegedly promoting a wartime system and preparing to invade Taiwan.
- Accuse Xi of destroying the CCP’s “democratic centralism” and implementing a personal dictatorship. Xi is also to be blamed for the deterioration of the Chinese economy and people’s livelihoods, as well as the outbreak of social crises. Further, Xi is to be faulted for engaging in “wolf warrior diplomacy” abroad and making China the public enemy of developed countries.
- Deprive Xi of power, reform the CCP, and transform it into the Chinese Social Democratic Party. Those who replace Xi should also move China towards a democratic socialist parliamentary system, abandon the policy of menacing Taiwan with military force, and improve China’s diplomacy.
Yuan lists the “second generation red” who are allegedly plotting against Xi as:
- Liu Yuan.
- Deng Pufang (son of Deng Xiaoping).
- Hu Deping (son of Hu Yaobang).
- Chen Yuan (son of Chen Yun).
- Ma Xiaoli (daughter of Ma Wenrui).
- Luo Diandian (daughter of Luo Ruiqing).
- The children of Marshal Ye Jianying, Marshal He Long, Marshal Nie Rongzhen, Marshal Xu Xiangqian, General Su Yu, General Xu Haidong, General Wang Zhen.
- The children of Bo Yibo (minus the imprisoned Bo Xilai).
- Some military generals who are considered confidants of Xi are also allegedly part of this group.
Yuan Hongbing analyzed that this group of “second generation reds” are the “backbone” of the CCP elite and had family members who were persecuted during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. He added that this group “dares to openly inform the international community” of their scheme to promote political reform in the CCP to warn Xi that he will be “playing with fire” should he take a leaf out of Mao’s book and persecute the “second generation reds.”
Our take
1. Xi Jinping clearly sought to “spin tragedy into victory” in his 2024 new year address by glossing over the failures of his leadership and instead insisting that China had “very solidly, powerfully, energetically, and confidently” made domestic progress in 2023. Meanwhile, Xi’s boast about China’s diplomatic achievements in 2023 runs counter to the numerous setbacks in that area experienced by the CCP regime, including Xi having to offer up concessions to the U.S. when he met with President Joe Biden in California, as well as countries and companies increasingly accounting for geopolitical risks associated with China.
Beijing’s deep concerns about economic deterioration and other crises in 2024 can be glimpsed from Xi’s attempt to talk up the Chinese economy and “sing loudly about China’s bright economic prospects,” as well as the PRC authorities’ increasing efforts to clamp down on “negative speech” about the economy. With regard to the latter point, the Ministry of National Security recently issued several warnings against “making false claims about China,” including remarks that denigrate the Chinese economy. The PRC authorities have also censored several notable economic commentators, including Chinese joint-stock and corporate issues expert Liu Jipeng, financial blogger Hong Rong, Chinese financial commentator Shu Pi, economist Ma Guangyuan, financial writer Wu Xiaobo, securities expert Dan Bin, and former senior investment consultant at CICC Wealth Securities Xu Xiaoyu.
The elevation of economic commentary to a national security issue, coupled with the Xi leadership’s redoubled efforts to promote China’s “bright” economic prospects, further debunks Xi Jinping’s “achievements” as laid out in his new year message and exposes how CCP propaganda is becoming noticeably out of touch with facts and public sentiments.
2. The various commentaries in mainland media listed above and political rumors about elite opposition against Xi indicate that Xi Jinping is fast losing popular support and that his personal political risks are accumulating to critical levels.
The business and elite interests behind Caixin and Yicai appear to be very concerned that Xi is turning his back on “reform and opening up” and accelerating political regression in the regime. This is observed from Caixin championing “reform and opening up” and other aspects of Deng Xiaoping’s political legacy, as well as the “reform-minded” (at least based on public perception) late former premier Li Keqiang. Meanwhile, the interest groups behind Yicai are worried enough about China’s economic prospects and the deteriorating business environment that the media outlet has an editorial urging Beijing to loosen its control over the economy (i.e. “government decentralization and the independent expansion of rights”), or do the opposite of what Xi is currently pursuing. Yicai and Caixin’s seeming willingness to be subjected to greater scrutiny by the PRC authorities over expressing views that stray from what Beijing wants hints at the desperation of business and political elites in the PRC who are opposed to Xi and the direness of the situation in the regime.
We have doubts about the reliability of Yuan Hongbing’s “insider information” that Party princelings are organizing and petitioning against Xi on a mass scale, given the Xi leadership’s enhanced efforts to prevent such political mobilization in the first place. However, the fact that such a rumor exists indicates that influential figures in the CCP elite are getting very concerned that they could be next on the chopping board as Xi presses ahead with perpetual “self-revolution” and the anti-corruption campaign. It is more likely that Yuan’s “insider information” is a trial balloon of sorts floated by members of the CCP elite via the dissident jurist to get Xi’s attention and warn him of dire political consequences should their interests and persons be harmed in the course of “self-revolution.”
We believe that Xi will likely focus on eliminating the remnant Jiang faction and will not target the rest of the CCP elite if he can help it as he presses to secure a decisive advantage in factional struggle. It is inevitable, however, that the interests of many Party elites will be harmed when Xi goes after the Jiang faction and corrupt elements in the financial sector and system given the interconnectedness of political and business networks among the elite. This sets the stage for Xi’s political woes to worsen even as he moves to shore up his political security.
3. We wrote in our China 2024 Outlook that “Xi’s doubling down on strengthening his control over the regime and the systemic deficiencies of the CCP dictatorship will hurt more than help Beijing’s effort to resolve the various crises.”
Should the Xi leadership continue along its current trajectory, 2024 could see the triggering of China’s internal and external risks in a concentrated fashion and the emergence of economic Gray Rhinos and political Black Swans in China.
3 Sweeping military purges likely to increase political instability in the PRC
Dec. 14
Asia Sentinel reported that the PRC authorities’ investigation into the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has led to the arrest of at least 70 individuals, citing an analyst from Canadian geopolitical consulting firm Cercius Group.
Dec. 25
Wang Wenquan, political commissar of the PLA Southern Theater Command, and Hu Zhongming, commander of the PLA Navy, were both promoted to the rank of general.
Wang, 61, is a career political work officer in the military. He was promoted to the rank of major general in July 2014 and steadily rose up the ranks. Wang previously served as political commissar of the Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission from September 2020 to December 2023, and became a member of the 20th Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress.
Hu, 59, is a career navy officer. He was promoted to the rank of rear admiral in July 2014, and previously served as chief of staff of the PLAN from December 2021 to December 2023. Hu became a member of the 20th Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress.
Dec. 27
The 12th chairman’s meeting of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference revoked the seats of:
- Wu Yansheng (60), chairman of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.
- Liu Shiquan (60), chairman of China North Industries Group Corporation Limited.
- Wang Changqing (51), deputy general manager of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation.
Dec. 29
The seventh meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress removed nine military generals as deputies of the body and from other positions, including:
- General Ding Laihang, former PLA Air Force commander and former deputy chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department.
- General Li Yuchao, former PLA Rocket Force commander and member of the 20th Central Committee of CCP.
- General Zhou Yaning, former PLARF commander.
- Lieutenant General Li Chuanguang, former PLARF deputy commander.
- Major General Lu Hong, PLA Equipment Development director.
- Lieutenant General Zhang Zhenzhong, CMC Joint Staff Department deputy chief and former PLARF deputy commander.
- Lieutenant General Zhang Yulin, former PLA EDD deputy director.
- Major General Rao Wenmin, PLA EDD deputy director.
- Lieutenant General Ju Xinchun, commander of the Southern Theater Command Navy.
The Standing Committee of the NPC also appointed Dong Jun as defense minister. Dong, 62, previously served as PLAN commander from August 2021 to December 2023. Dong is a graduate of the Dalian Naval Academy and has prior experience engaging in military diplomacy.
Dec. 31
Hong Kong media Sing Tao Daily claimed in a report that the PLARF military equipment procurement scandal that broke out after the 20th Party Congress was “extensive” and involved the corruption of those previously heading the force.
Sing Tao claimed that the nine generals who were removed from the NPC were “just the tip of the iceberg” of corruption in the PLA, and the fact that they were being investigated was confirmed (to CCP regime outsiders) by their ouster from the PRC’s rubber stamp legislature. Sing Tao added that the former PLARF political commissar Xu Zhongbo had not been removed from his post as an NPC deputy despite being relieved from his military position and speculated that he might still have “leadership responsibilities.”
Sing Tao also claimed that the PLARF leadership has been “almost wiped out” and that the scandal entangles:
- The prior three PLARF commanders Wei Fenghe, Zhou Yanning, and Li Yuchao.
- Liu Guangbin, PLARF deputy commander.
- Sun Jinming, PLARF chief of staff and alternate member of the Central Committee.
- Li Jun, former PLARF deputy commander and current commander of the CMC’s Joint Operation Command Center.
- Li Tongjian, deputy director of the PLARF’s equipment department.
- Wu Guohua, former PLARF duty commander; Wu was previously rumored to have committed suicide in 2023 when the PLARF scandal was unfolding.
Sing Tao claimed that other senior military officials involved in the PLARF scandal include:
- Admiral Ju Gansheng, PLA Strategic Support Force commander.
- Lieutenant General Feng Danyu, PLAN deputy commander.
- Vice Admiral Wang Dazhong, North Sea Fleet commander.
Sing Tao claimed that the PLARF scandal involved at least seven full generals, at least 30 senior military officers at the major general rank and higher, and even more military cadres at the division level.
Jan. 6
Bloomberg News reported U.S. intelligence as indicating that Xi Jinping carried out his sweeping military purge after learning that “widespread corruption undermined his efforts to modernize the armed forces and raised questions about China’s ability to fight a war,” citing people familiar with the assessment.
According to the people:
- The corruption inside the PLARF and the PRC defense industrial base is so extensive that U.S. officials now believe that Xi is “less likely to contemplate major military action in the coming years than would otherwise have been the case.”
- Examples of the impact of the corruption include missiles filled with water instead of fuel and vast fields of missile silos in western China with lids that do not function in a manner that would allow the missiles to launch effectively.
- The U.S. assesses that PLA corruption has led to an erosion of confidence in its overall capabilities, particularly with regard to the PLARF, and sets back some of Xi’s top modernization priorities.
- The U.S. assesses that Xi was not weakened by the purge and that his removal of senior military officers shows that his grip over the CCP is firm and he is “serious about improving discipline, eliminating corruption and ultimately preparing China’s military for combat over the long term.”
Our take
1. The recent removal of nine generals from the NPC and three senior executives from the PRC’s defense industrial base from the CPPCC, as well as Bloomberg’s report on U.S. assessment of Xi Jinping’s military purges, indicate that there are major corruption issues in the PLA. Those developments and information appear to debunk the more speculative rumors about the high-level personnel changes last year (removal of Qin Gang, Li Shangfu, and top PLARF officials), including the rumor that the purges were linked to the leaking of sensitive intelligence abroad. We earlier expressed skepticism about some of the rumors and analyzed that the military purges were likely due to severe corruption.
Some overseas Chinese language media had also previously identified corruption, and not leaking of secrets, as the central factor behind the current military purges. In October 2023, Hong Kong media Ming Pao noted in reporting the alleged surrender of PLARF equipment department director Lu Hong to the authorities in September 2023 that the bulk of the senior generals who had been purged were not removed over so-called “leaks” that observers had been speculating about but due to economic corruption involving project contracting, arms procurement, and other areas.
Xi’s current military purge likely goes further than the removal of the nine generals from the PRC legislature and the three senior defense industry executives from the top political consultative body. Most of the information about the anti-corruption effort is being obscured from the public as the CCP authorities have stopped releasing military anti-corruption information since the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The authorities, however, had to acknowledge the purge of the 12 individuals because their position as deputies had to be revoked before the regime’s judicial organs can proceed to formally prosecute them.
2. In considering the factional struggle angle, we previously analyzed that “There is a possibility that the PLARF case and the Qin Gang case are efforts by Xi Jinping’s remaining factional rivals and the ‘anti-Xi coalition,’ including elements opposed to Xi in the military or the CCP intelligence apparatus’s ‘hidden front’ (see here and here), to exploit the Xi leadership’s prioritization of national security matters to ‘manipulate’ the PRC leader into taking out his own allies and ultimately undermining his own interests.”
Given that it is now almost certain that the PLA has been subjected to heightened anti-corruption scrutiny and purges for some time, it cannot be ruled out that Xi’s rivals released the more speculative rumors and “leaks” last year to divert attention away from what Xi was trying to accomplish (i.e. tackle severe corruption in the military) and seize the opportunity to frame Xi in the public’s eye as an unhinged and unstable dictator who is carrying out Stalin-like purges.
3. The uncovering of sweeping corruption in the PLA, particularly in the PLARF and the EDD, could be partly due to increased efforts by the anti-corruption authorities under its new chief and Xi Jinping ally Li Xi. If so, this means that former anti-corruption head and Jiang faction associate Zhao Leji had been negligent (“不作爲”) in his duties and had instead “publicly complied with but privately defied” (陽奉陰違) Xi during his second term.
The exposure of purges also casts a shadow on the Xi leadership’s earlier propaganda (from as early as 2017) about winning an “overwhelming victory” against corruption and underscores the systemic nature of corruption in the regime. In particular, the corruption problem in the PLA was greatly worsened during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance when Jiang cronies and former CMC vice chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou fostered a culture where it was common for officers to bribe their way up the ranks and engage in other corrupt activities for personal profit.
We believe that Xi’s “self-revolution” efforts will not do much to eliminate corruption but will instead accelerate the development of crises.
4. The widespread and endemic problem of corruption in the military makes it very difficult for Xi Jinping to achieve his goal of modernizing the PLA by his stated deadlines and readying it to fight and win wars. In the short term, the Xi leadership will be severely restricted in its ability to invade Taiwan or provoke serious conflicts near the PRC’s borders; this may be why Xi Jinping denied having plans to take Taiwan to President Joe Biden and offered concessions at their summit in November 2023.
Serious corruption in the PLA would also strain the regime’s resources, which are growing scarcer with the rapid deterioration of the Chinese economy. We previously analyzed that the Li Shangfu and PLARF cases could involve “corruption on par with or exceeding that of the semiconductor ‘great leap forward,’ costing the CCP regime immense sums of money while yielding next to nothing in return.
Finally, the sweeping anti-corruption effort targeting the military could worsen Xi’s political problems. We previously analyzed that the probe into Li Shangfu could “implicate a slew of Xi allies or loyalists in the military or military-related industries,” and investigations that lead to the “mass sidelining of Xi’s allies or loyalists will increase the paranoia and suspicion of Xi towards his cronies and vice versa, resulting in significant and regime-endangering political instability.” Panicked active and retired senior military officials could come to believe that they must move against Xi to save their skin, and political Black Swans could emerge in China should Xi’s rivals decide that the time has come to take decisive action.