SinoInsight 1
The CCP kicked its propaganda into overdrive in the lead up to its centennial celebration on July 1, signaling “all’s well” (形勢一片大好) in the regime despite mounting domestic and external problems.
Crisis, however, cannot completely be obscured. Official commentary articles and centennial celebration events reveal signs of serious internal divisions and dissatisfaction in the CCP ranks, and a growing political crisis.
June 24
The official website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission issued a commentary titled “The Origin of the ‘Four Principles of Deference’” (“四個服從”的由來) under its “Review the Classics and Move Forward Amid Adversity” (重溫經典 砥礪前行) section. The piece debuted as the lead article on the website.
The CCP’s “Four Principles of Deference” (henceforth referred to as the “Four Deferences”) are: Individual Party members defer to Party organizations; the minority defers to the majority; lower-level Party organizations defer to higher-level Party organizations; and all organizations and members of the Party defer to the CCP Central Committee. The commentary noted that the “Four Deferences” were first proposed by Mao Zedong in his political report, “On the New Stage” (論新階段), that was put forth at the “destiny deciding” (決定之命運) Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938.
The commentary also noted that the “Four Deferences” came about as the direct result of two incidents, namely, CCP founding member Zhang Guotao splitting the Party and the Red Army during the Long March, as well as early CCP senior leader Wang Ming’s refusal to implement Party Central’s decisions and his disruptive “independence” from the Central Committee during his tenure as secretary of the Yangtze River Bureau.
In concluding, the commentary stressed that the “Four Deferences” essentially entail that the entire CCP must obey Party Central and maintain Party unity. Further, the CCP was able to achieve “historical accomplishments and changes” in “the face of the severe and complex domestic and international situation” because it “resolutely safeguarded Party Central with General Secretary Xi Jinping at the core, the Party’s core position, and the quan wei [prestige and authority] of Party Central and its centralized and unified leadership.” Finally, the commentary called on all Party members to “persevere with the ‘Four Deferences’ and be absolutely loyal to the Party,” as well as “unite closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, unify our will and actions, and move forward in unison.”
June 25
1. The People’s Liberation Army Daily published a commentary by anonymous author “Jie Xinping” (解辛平; possibly a homophone for “Explaining [what] Xi Jinping [wants]”) titled, “The Military Flag Always Follows the Party Flag” (軍旗永遠跟著黨旗走).
The piece established Xi Jinping’s authority over the military almost from the get-go, “In the New Era, Chairman Xi will lead the three branches of the military on a journey of strengthening and rejuvenation.” Meanwhile, the PLA derives its mandate (metaphorical “flag”) from Xi, the “Party core, military commander, and people’s leader.”
The commentary singled out Zhang Guotao for censure. Zhang is labeled an “ambitionist” who believed that he could “struggle against the Party and establish another Party Central” because his “ambitions swelled” and he grew “overconfident [in possessing] more people and more guns.” The commentary noted, however, that the Red Army “resolutely followed the Party” and the “conspirators” were beaten. Since then, the piece claims, the CCP has established a system where the Party has “absolute leadership” over the military, and “the Party and country ‘cannot be chaotic,’ the military ‘cannot defect,’ and conspirators ‘cannot rebel.’”
The commentary also notes that “the soul of the military will never change, and the military flag will always take after the Party.” Further, the PLA must “fundamentally” strengthen its adherence to Xi’s “Four Consciousnesses,” “Four Confidences,” and “Two Protections,” as well as “implement the CMC chairman responsibility system; ensure that the military absolutely loyal, honest, and reliable; and guarantee that the gun barrel will always follow the Party’s command.”
2. Xi Jinping presided over the incumbent CCP Politburo’s thirty-first collective study session on the theme of “making good use of red resources and continuing the red bloodline” (用好紅色資源、賡續紅色血脈). As part of the study session, Xi led the Politburo on a tour of the Peking University Red Building and Mao Zedong’s former residence at Fengze Garden.
According to state media, Xi said that the Party should “strengthen the protection and utilization of red resources,” “appraise history accurately, as well as learn and use history well,” and “educate and guide the whole Party to always persevere in its ideals and beliefs.”
June 26
PRC state media reported on the opening of a research center for “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law” in Beijing. Wang Chen, a Politburo member and president of the China Law Society, attended the opening and delivered a speech.
Wang said that research at the center will be guided by “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” The “research, interpretation, and propagation of Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law” will “transform” the “comprehensive governance of the country by law,” Wang said, and better serve the “overall work of the Party and the country.” Wang also noted that “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law” is the “latest accomplishment” in the Party’s effort to Sinicize Marxist theory of the rule of law.
State media reports state that Party Central approved the newly opened research center and is the second such institution to be established to promote “Xi Thought.”
June 27
1. State mouthpiece Xinhua published a commentary on the recent Politburo study session titled “This Group Study Session is Special. What Makes it So?” (這次集體學習安排特別，有何深意).
The commentary explained that the CCP’s founding members Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu met at the Peking University Red Building to discuss plans for spreading communism and fermenting revolutionary activities back in the day. Meanwhile, Fengze Garden was where Mao Zedong lived and worked for 17 years.
The commentary noted that that was “deep meaning” in the Politburo leading the way in advancing the study of Party history, and stressed the importance of Xi’s request for Party members to get educated in CCP history.
2. Mainland media reported that “The Great Journey,” a curtain-raiser, three-hour CCP centennial show at the Beijing National Stadium, would be held on June 28 instead of June 29 as originally scheduled. Strict control over traffic in the area was later implemented.
June 28
1. Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published a commentary titled, “The Regime is the People, the People are the Regime—A Summary of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Expositions on People-centeredness.”
The commentary lists what Xi previously said about “not forgetting the original aspiration” (不忘初心) and “helping the people find happiness” (為人民謀幸福). Xi is portrayed as a “people’s leader who comes from the people, has deep feelings for the people, and has a strong sense of responsibility to the people.” Also, Xi is said to “have the people in his heart and head at all times” throughout his official career.
2. The CCP held its curtain-raiser event for the CCP centennial at the Beijing National Stadium. Members of the CCP elite in attendance include Xi Jinping and the six other Politburo Standing Committee members, PRC vice president Wang Qishan, and 10 former Politburo Standing Committee members, including Jiang faction members Zeng Qinghong and Li Ruihuan. Eight former Politburo Standing Committee members were absent, including Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, Wu Bangguo, Song Ping, Li Lanqing, Luo Gan, Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao.
“The Great Journey” performance was divided into four epic-style chapters, namely, the founding of the CCP and its seizure of power after the Chinese civil war; Mao’s rule and the Korean War; “reform and opening up” and the leadership of Deng, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao; and finally, the rule of Xi Jinping. At the conclusion of the performance, the entire audience rose to sing the classic propaganda song, “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China” (沒有共產黨就沒有新中國).
The curtain-raiser event was not aired live, but was recapped on the June 29 edition of “Xinwen Lianbo,” state broadcaster China Central Television’s prime time nightly news program. The focus of the recap was on Xi Jinping and chapter of the performance on his rule, although all four other Party bosses also had close-ups and air time.
Meanwhile, overseas Chinese language media “spotted” PRC vice premier Hu Chunhua seemingly not clapping at the performance on the “Xinwen Lianbo” footage and began speculating on the issue. A review of the “Xinwen Lianbo” footage showed that Hu placed his arms on the arm rest only after clapping; the widely circulated screenshot, however, gave the impression that he did not give applause at all.
In an unprecedented arrangement, foreign media covering the event were forbidden from bringing cell phones and other communication equipment to the stadium, and video footage of the event could only be released three days after (July 1).
3. The CCDI published a short film on its website titled, “Discipline in Party History (1) Resolutely Achieve the ‘Two Safeguards’” (黨史中的紀律 (1) 堅決做到“兩個維護”).
The film spotlighted the case of Bao Huiseng, an early CCP revolutionary who served as a high-level infiltrator for the Party in the Kuomintang. The Party later blamed and punished Bao for the break up of the first KMT-CCP united front in 1927, and the latter left the Party and officially joined the KMT government. In April 1927, the CCP established its first Central Supervisory Commission and announced that Bao was punished to “safeguard the Party’s quan wei and its centralized and unified leadership.”
The film also criticized Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming for “disobeying Party Central,” and upheld them as “wrongful examples of non-compliance with political discipline.”
4. Xiao Pei, the deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and deputy director of the National Supervisory Commission, announced anti-corruption campaign data in a press conference to mark the CCP centennial.
According to Xiao, the CCP opened 3.85 million cases, investigated 4.089 million people, and punished 3.742 million people since discipline inspections were carried out after the 18th Party Congress. From December 2012 to May 2021, the anti-corruption authorities investigated 392 officials at the provincial and ministerial level and above; 22,000 officials at the bureau level; 170,000 officials at the county level; and 616,000 officials at the town level. Xiao also said that 42,000 officials “voluntarily surrendered” themselves to the anti-corruption authorities since the 19th Party Congress in 2019.
Analysis: Below is what Xiao Pei’s numbers entail in terms of percentages:
- 10 percent of officials at the deputy ministerial rank and above have been purged (392 out of an estimated 3,000-3,500 officials).
- 50 percent of officials at the bureau level (22,000 out of 40,000-45,000).
- Close to half of those working in Party or state apparatuses (3.742 million out of 7.773 million [per 2020 Party membership data released by the CCP Organization Department]).
June 29
The CCP held a “July 1 Medal” (七一勳章) award ceremony in the Great Hall of the People. Xi Jinping handed out medals to 29 Party members, and delivered a speech calling on CCP members to “always believe, love, and serve the Party” (永遠信黨愛黨為黨), as well as “struggle for and be devoted to” (拼搏奉獻) the Party.
According to the Central Commission’s decision on awarding the medals (中共中央關於授予“七一勳章”的決定) published by Xinhua, the medal recipients are supposedly “outstanding representatives” of Party members from different era. “They possess faith, conviction, loyalty, and unyielding oath to the Party and people, and have devoted their all to both,” the decision read. The Central Committee also called on the entire Party to be guided by “Xi Thought,” take the “July 1 Medal” recipients as role models, united more closely around “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” and perpetuate the “CCP spirit and bloodline.”
July 1
The CCP held a ceremony commemorating its centennial at Tiananmen Square. Xi Jinping, dressed in a gray Mao suit, presided over the event at the viewing gallery on top of Tiananmen with many Party elders and elites. Noticeably absent from the proceedings was former Party boss Jiang Zemin, his premier Zhu Rongji, and his security chief Luo Gan.
Xi’s centennial speech was largely a repackaging of the CCP’s propaganda and lies, including crediting the Party for defeating the Japanese invaders and imperialists; claiming that history and the Chinese people “chose” the Party to “save” China; and conflating traditional Chinese civilization with Marxist heritage.
Some highlights of Xi’s speech include:
- “This country is its people; the people are the country … The Party has in the people its roots, its lifeblood, and its source of strength. The Party has always represented the fundamental interests of all Chinese people; it stands with them through thick and thin and shares a common fate with them.”
- “The Party has no special interests of its own—it has never represented any individual interest group, power group, or privileged stratum. Any attempt to divide the Party from the Chinese people or to set the people against the Party is bound to fail. The more than 95 million Party members and the more than 1.4 billion Chinese people will never allow such a scenario to come to pass.”
- “We will not, however, accept sanctimonious preaching from those who feel they have the right to lecture us.”
- “We have never bullied, oppressed, or subjugated the people of any other country, and we never will. By the same token, we will never allow any foreign force to bully, oppress, or subjugate us. Anyone who would attempt to do so will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.”
- “The patriotic united front is an important means for the Party to unite all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, both at home and abroad, behind the goal of national rejuvenation.”
- “On the journey ahead, we must ensure great unity and solidarity and balance commonality and diversity … so that all Chinese people, both at home and overseas, can focus their ingenuity and energy on the same goal and come together as a mighty force for realizing national rejuvenation.”
- “We need to acquire a full understanding of the new features and requirements arising from the change to the principal contradiction in Chinese society and the new issues and challenges stemming from a complicated international environment. We must be both brave and adept in carrying out our struggle, forging new paths and building new bridges wherever necessary to take us past all risks and challenges.”
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping is clearly leveraging on the CCP centennial celebrations to vigorously tout his achievements and establish his “quan wei”; re-emphasize to the Party and the military the importance of upholding and obeying his “core” leadership amid trying times for the regime; and put on notice those challenging his rule.
Likewise, Xi’s promotion of revised Party history is designed to elevate his status. The overarching narrative begins with the CCP’s early founders and Mao Zedong before “jumping” to Xi and his “achievements.” Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping and his handpicked successors (Jiang and Hu) are mentioned almost in passing, with their “achievements” essentially watered down. All in all, Xi is cast as standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Mao and an orthodox Marxist leading the advance of Chinese socialism, while the Party leaders in between are practically a historical footnote.
Party history aside, Xi’s choice of dress on July 1, recent speeches and slogans, as well as certain commemorative events, suggest an effort by Xi to heavily “associate” himself with Mao. As we explained previously, Xi appears to be “associating” himself with Mao and his tokens of “quan wei” to boost his own “quan wei.” However, the fact that Xi needs to so closely “associate” himself with Mao and revise Party history indicates that he is sorely lacking in “quan wei” owing to insufficient concrete, unblemished accomplishments since taking office in 2012.
Xi’s various measures build towards his push for a norm-breaking third term in office at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, as well as lay the groundwork for future purges of disloyal elements and factional opponents.
2. As we have noted on a number of occasions, the CCP usually has problems in issues that it repeatedly calls attention to in propaganda. Oftentimes, the greater the hype, the greater the problem.
The references to “conspirators” and “another Party Central” in the recent commentaries by the anti-corruption authorities and the PLA echo similar messaging on the issue that has been emerging consistently since late April (see here and here). Repetition of such pointed political messaging indicates that Beijing is having serious problems with officials not obeying Xi’s Party Central, traitors/defectors, and renewed challenges from Xi’s factional rivals (see here and here).
While certainly a major cause for concern, factional struggle is not the only political crisis facing Xi. CCP officials in general appear to be disillusioned with Xi, the Party, and the regime. After all, Xi Jinping has very few genuine accomplishments outside of his anti-corruption effort (a campaign that has only swelled the ranks of Xi’s enemies), and also managed to turn the world against the CCP with his “Great Power Diplomacy”/“wolf warrior” diplomacy. As domestic and foreign pressures mount, CCP officials become disincentivized to “struggle” for Xi and the Party, and could even be more inclined to put up “passive resistance” against the system.
Demoralization in the lower ranks and strife at the top likely influenced Xi Jinping’s decision to hand out prestigious “July 1 Medals” to lower ranking and less prominent CCP members. By recognizing lower ranking officials, Xi is hoping to garner much-needed support from the Party’s base ahead of the 20th Party Congress while not elevating potential challengers to his rule.
3. The CCP’s sense of crisis is reflected in its handling of the various centennial events. Very strict security protocols were put in place in Beijing in the lead up to the centennial, including streets packed with security personnel, speed restrictions, the halting of traffic on roads leading to venues, orders for residents to stay in their homes, and the imposition of quasi-martial law in surrounding areas. The very unusual rescheduling of the curtain-raiser show and restrictions on foreign media also reflect the security situation in Beijing and the tension in the air.
It is possible that the centennial curtain-raiser show on June 28 was brought forward a day due to the weather forecast or other more mundane reasons. However, it cannot be ruled out that there were serious security issues at hand. For instance, Beijing could be tipped off to potential sabotage and the organizers could have rescheduled the event at last-minute to thwart saboteur preparations.
All in all, the security situation in Beijing reflects the CCP’s unceasing wariness towards the Chinese people and foreigners even in its one hundredth year of existence. Per the Party’s survival-dominance outlook, the Chinese people and the world are enemies to be perpetually guarded against, especially on an occasion of celebration. Commemoration of the CCP’s centennial is less celebration and more forced glorification of the Party, killing the festive spirit.
4. Prominent Party elders were noticeably absent from the centennial curtain-raiser event and the July 1 event at Tiananmen Square. While the factional background of the missing individuals (Jiang faction) suggest that factional struggle was a key factor, a more likely reason could be poor health. For one, Jiang Zemin will turn 95 this August, and could possibly not be in good enough physical condition to take the stage alongside the other Party elders. However, the appearance of prominent Jiang faction members like Zeng Qinghong (the Jiang faction number two) and Liu Yunshan indicate that the faction still remains influential.
Meanwhile, the significance and implications of Hu Chunhua seemingly not applauding at the curtain-raiser event range from trivia to potentially grave. Technically, Hu should not get into any trouble because the June 29 “Xinwen Lianbo” footage clearly showed that he had clapped and just happened to be “caught” on camera at precisely the wrong moment. However, intense speculation about Hu in the overseas Chinese environment could increase Xi’s suspicions of him and heighten his political risks.
5. Xi Jinping’s July 1 speech exposes his and the CCP’s extreme insecurities amid escalating international and domestic pressures.
In particular, Xi appears to be very troubled by efforts in the international community in recent years to draw a distinction between the Chinese people and the Party. Thus, Xi sought to bind the Party and the Chinese people even closer together by claiming a “common fate” between the two and issuing a belligerent warning to those attempting to split the two that they will be on a “collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.” Xi’s belligerence runs counter to his recent call for the regime’s diplomats and propagandists to be more “lovable,” and reflects his and the CCP’s anxiety, paranoia, and sense of vulnerability in the Party’s moment of celebration.
Xi and the CCP’s efforts to tightly control society, however, will inevitably inspire pushback in some form or other from the Chinese people (“laying flatism,” etc.). Businesses, investors, and governments need to make contingencies for the CCP’s “Berlin Wall” moment and political Black Swans in China.