The new State Council work rules further affirm Xi Jinping and Party Central’s paramount authority over the state government.
Xi’s trip to Moscow could potentially be viewed later as the pivotal moment when the “new cold war” became official.
The areas of focus of Xi Jinping’s “investigation and research” campaign and Mao Zedong’s precedent suggest that Xi is taking a leaf out of Mao’s playbook
The “daggers” and “pistols” that Mao praised Lu Xun for using to expose and criticize Chinese society a century ago are now close to being turned against the CCP regime.
Xi has long consolidated power with an eye to sidelining factional rivals and improving Beijing’s “governing capacity” so as to better navigate the CCP regime out of crises.
Xi Jinping closing remarks at the Two Sessions and Xinhua’s feature justifying his re-election hint at Xi’s vulnerabilities and concerns even as he centralized power to an even higher degree with the recent State Council reforms and personnel appointments.
Xi’s leadership position may be stronger after the Two Sessions, but there are still questions about whether his governance ability will be boosted simply by having more “loyalists” in key positions.
Beijing has likely decided that the only way forward was to act the victim of “U.S. imperialism” and double standards, fault Washington for worsening Sino-U.S. relations, and play the nationalism card at home to deflect responsibility for the PRC’s serious internal and external crises away from the Xi leadership and on to America.
The CCP’s “digital China” and TCM projects are aimed at breaking the PRC out of Western “containment” and advancing its agenda of survival and domination.
The CCP is trying to revive a rapidly deteriorating Chinese economy that was further worsened by three years of “zero-COVID,” save the real estate sector, and turn around China’s population decline.