Xi urges officials to ‘submit’ to his rule; PLAC ‘rectification’ campaign goes to the top

Oct. 18
CCP Central Party School publication Study Times published an article on Chinese dynastic history titled, “Wuyue Gui Song” (吳越歸宋, or roughly, “The Kingdom of Wuyue Returns to the Song Dynasty”).

The article notes that the Kingdom of Wuyue in southeastern China was the longest surviving and most prosperous kingdom during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (907–960). While Wuyue could technically vie with the Song Dynasty for dominance after the latter was established, Qian Chu, the last king of Wuyue, “grasped the state of current affairs” and submitted to Song instead in accordance with principles passed down by his ancestors concerning virtue and the legitimacy of rulers, and to save his people from the ravages of war (or as Study Times cites in classical Chinese, 凡中國之君, 雖易異姓, 宜善事之。要度德量力, 而識時務, 如遇真君主, 宜速歸附, 聖人云順天者存。又云民為貴、社稷次之。免動干戈。). Wuyue’s absorption into the Song Dynasty led to the reunification of China.

Study Times added that Wuyue’s “peaceful return” meant that its people were “spared the calamity of destruction.” Also, the historic city of Hangzhou in Wuyue escaped the “flames of war” and enjoyed a millennium of prosperity. On the flipside, the city of Jinling (today’s Nanjing) met with “catastrophe” against the Song following stubborn resistance by the Southern Tang Dynasty.

Study Times noted that Emperor Taizong of Song “cherished” King Qian Chu’s action in “returning” Wuyue to Song, and vowed to forever protect the wealth and prosperity of Qian Chu’s descendants for perpetuity. Qian Chu himself received “unprecedented courtesy,” and the 3,000 members of his clan who followed him to the capital also did very well; over a thousand were given official posts and one of Qian Chu’s sons was appointed grand chancellor (宰相), and those who did not want to work were also well rewarded. Many of Qian Chu’s descendants ended up marrying members of the ruling Zhao clan.

The Study Times piece concluded by noting that the Qian clan enjoyed long-lasting prosperity and produced many talents over a millenia and into the modern era. The piece finished with an observation that history has shown that benevolent people will be rewarded with good fortune (歲月始終不負仁者).

Oct. 22
Study Times published another article on Chinese dynastic history titled “‘Plans for Reigning in Peace’ by Jia Yi of the Western Han” (西漢賈誼的<治安策>).

The article noted that Jia Yi, a prominent thinker from the Western Han Dynasty, submitted many memorials on how to govern to the court in his day. Those memorials were later collated into the text, “Plans for Reigning in Peace” (治安策; henceforth referred to as “Plans”).

In the “Plans,” Jia Yi called attention to “major problem” of “weak rulers, strong ministers” (君弱臣強) in China that emerged after the fall of the Qin Dynasty and persisted into the Han Dynasty. Jia then advocated the establishment of a strict political order where the central government has supreme and absolute authority over the localities, and the localities must be in complete compliance with the central government’s orders. Jia Yi believed that only when the body is in control of the limbs and the limbs follow the body’s commands (令海內之勢, 如身之使臂, 臂之使指, 莫不制從) can national unity and stability be maintained, according to Study Times.

Study Times noted that the An Lushan Rebellion broke out during the Tang Dynasty because regional governments became too powerful. The aftermath of the rebellion saw the Tang, a peak period in Chinese civilization, shift from prosperity to decline.

Study Times also noted that Jia Yi attributed the problem of moral decay in the “declining world” (世風日下) to “ruling without doing anything” (無為而治), and suggested that rulers use “active” (有為) politics to “strongly rectify” the “bad atmosphere” (惡劣風氣). Jia also advised rulers to “use the core philosophy of the state to rally the people and build social consensus.”

In concluding, the article noted that the “Plans” is one of the most important political works in Chinese history because it “resolutely safeguards the ‘quan wei’ (權威) of the central government” and opposes the notion of localities splitting the country. Hence, the “Plans” played an important role in “the consolidation of society and even the continuity of the kingdom for future generations” (對鞏固社稷乃至延綿後世國祚都起到了重要作用).

Oct. 23
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) passed a decision regarding the “temporary adjustment of the application of relevant laws and regulations during a period of deepening reform of the national defense mobilization system” (全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於深化國防動員體制改革期間暫時調整適用相關法律規定的決定).

The decision suspended four laws pertaining to national defense and mobilization for an unspecified period, and did not offer details on how the suspension would be implemented. Instead, the decision noted that it would be carried out “in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Party Central Committee, as well as the relevant regulations of the State Council and the Central Military Commission. When reform measures are mature, timely amendments would be made to improve the relevant laws.”

Explainer: Party Central (“with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core”) will have a free hand in making decisions regarding defense mobilization during the period in which the national defense and mobilization laws are suspended. Party Central will also determine how long the laws will be suspended and how to amend them.

Oct. 26
Duowei News, the Beijing-based overseas Chinese language media outlet, published an article titled, “Spring and Autumn Pen | The Inside Story of Qiao Guanhua’s Betrayal of Zhou Enlai and the Shifting of Allegiance to Jiang Qing” (春秋筆｜喬冠華背叛周恩來倒向江青內幕).

The article notes that Qiao Guanhua was the right-hand man of Zhou Enlai, the “godfather of PRC diplomacy,” and had participated in several high-profile diplomatic events like the PRC’s entry to the United Nations in 1971 (Qiao led the PRC delegation to attend the UN General Assembly and delivered a speech) and the drafting of the first Sino-U.S. joint communiqué in 1972. In 1974, Qiao was appointed foreign minister.

The Duowei article added that Qiao Guanhua was later found to be in league with the “Gang of Four.” The article claimed that a search of “Gang of Four” member Wang Hongwen’s home after the faction met its downfall in 1976 found Qiao’s name on a list of proposed cabinet members. The list designated Qiao as a Politburo member and a vice premier, while his wife Zhang Hanzhi was designated as director of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Qiao Guanhua and his wife were subjected to review by the Central Case Examination Group and Qiao was subsequently removed from his foreign minister post in December 1976.

The article then cited a book by longtime Zhou Enlai associate and Ministry of Foreign Affairs deputy director Zhang Ying as saying that Qiao Guanhua and his wife were “recruited by Jiang Qing” and had “formed a gang.” Also, Jiang Qing reportedly sought to transfer Zhang Ying to the Cultural Revolution Group to oversee work there. Zhang Ying claimed that Qiao Guanhua told her, “You know the current situation of the Cultural Revolution. Premier Zhou [Enlai] is seriously ill and doesn’t seem long for this world. ‘A wise man submits to circumstances’ [識時務者為俊傑], and you should have a good think [about joining the “Gang of Four” faction and abandoning Zhou Enlai]; besides, Jiang Qing thinks highly of you.” (Zhang Ying did not join the Jiang Qing clique.)

The article also cites the memoirs of Huang Hua, who succeeded Qiao Guanhua as foreign minister, which exposed Qiao as having denounced Zhou Enlai in the later state of the Cultural Revolution. Huang also wrote that Qiao, whose outlook on life was “a wise man submits to circumstances” (識時務者為俊傑), ultimately sought refuge with the Jiang Qing clique.

1. Upon initial reading of the Oct. 18 Study Times piece, it would seem the commentary is using a historical episode to promote the PRC’s effort to achieve “reunification” with the ROC. The CCP appears to be persuading Taiwan’s elite to submit to the PRC and avoid war, with Party boss Xi Jinping “guaranteeing” the prosperity of Taiwan’s elites and their descendants after the “return” of the island to the communist regime.

The publication of the piece in Study Times (a publication directed at the Party itself), and not in more “mainstream” mainland outlets, indicates that its intended audience is not Taiwan, but CCP members and the Party elite. In view of factional struggle in the Party elite, it is more likely that Xi is urging the “red nobility” to “grasp the state of current affairs” (識時務) and recognize the “true monarch” (Xi) as soon as possible (遇真君主, 宜速归附) preserve themselves and their descendants, and avoid meeting “catastrophe” (滅頂之災) like the city of Jinling.

The Study Times piece, when read together with critical factional struggle developments and the temporary suspension of national defense and mobilization laws, opens up the following scenario for Xi to deal with “another Party Central” and secure a decisive victory in the CCP factional struggle. Party members and the elite have been granted a chance to “submit” to Xi and stop opposing him in exchange for the political safety of themselves and their clan. But if Xi discovers or suspects continued resistance or coup efforts, he could take advantage of Party Central’s current “free hand” over defense mobilization matters to round up rival elements and “bring order out of chaos.”

Meanwhile, Xi could take advantage of political conclaves where the Central Committee is gathered in Beijing (like the upcoming Sixth Plenum) to suppress the Party elite into submission. For instance, elite officials could be secluded away in locations such as the military-run Jingxi Hotel where plenary sessions are held in the name of ensuring their personal “security” given the outbreak of an “unusual” political crisis. Holding the elites in this way prevents them from colluding with each other to oppose him, and also ensures that Beijing has the elite under tight surveillance and control. When meetings are held to address the situation, Xi could have military troops marching in first and standing at attention along the sides, similar to the 2018 Two Sessions meeting where the Central Committee was going to vote Wang Qishan as vice president, to show that he wields the Party’s “gun” and intimidate those present. Denouncement of coup plotters or members of a “political gang” could be made, and the elite would be subsequently made to sit through “education and rectification” sessions where they would learn to “grasp the state of current affairs” and not challenge “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.”

We wrote in our China 2021 Outlook, “political Black Swans are afoot when flight restrictions are suddenly imposed with no prior warning or martial law is declared in Beijing.” If such developments or other military-related effort to control the Party elite indeed takes place around the Sixth Plenum period, then it is likely that Xi Jinping could “upgrade” his “historical resolution” to include denouncements of his factional rivals, while efforts to scrub clean the political and legal affairs apparatus of lingering disloyal elements (even active leading cadres in the top echelons of the apparatus) could escalate.

If the Sixth Plenum passes without incident, however, then either Xi’s enemies have opted not to rock the boat, or Xi believes that he still lacks the political strength needed to decisively resolve the factional struggle in the CCP.

2. The Oct. 22 Study Times piece on the importance of political centralization, the need for “active” politics, and the necessity of reining in powerful local forces appears to be an attempt by Xi Jinping to use historical precedent to justify his consolidation of power to a high degree and factional struggle actions to Party elites and members.

The Study Times piece also indicates that Xi is looking to blame the PRC’s many problems today on the rampant corruption (“bad atmosphere”) and relative inactivity (“ruling without doing anything”) under his predecessor; the Hu Jintao government was frequently hamstrung and reduced to passivity by “emperor emeritus” Jiang Zemin and his faction. To prevent the CCP regime from declining like the Tang Dynasty and maintain “national unity and stability,” Xi Jinping signals that he has no choice but to heed the advice in one of the most important political works in Chinese history (“Plans for Reigning in Peace”), centralize power even more, and get tough against fractious forces in the “localities.” Meanwhile, officials are encouraged to align themselves with Party Central with “Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” and safeguard “Party unity and centralization.”

3. Duowei appears to have seized on the occasion of the PRC’s 50th anniversary of joining the UN on Oct. 25 to publish a piece with seeming relevance to the event.

While the piece seems to echo the theme of Study Times piece “Wuyue Gui Song,” it appears to call for the exact opposite in considering the present political context. Xi undoubtedly sees himself as the legitimate ruler of the “red” dynasty, but his opponents view him as a “counter-revolutionary” element like the “Gang of Four.” For instance, a proposal circulating in March 2020 after Xi was regarded to have botched the handling of the coronavirus outbreak called for an enlarged meeting of the Politburo to be held to “discuss the problem of Xi Jinping,” and noted that such a meeting would be “no less important” than those held to oust the “Gang of Four” and “much more important” than the plenum where Deng Xiaoping unveiled “reform and opening up” and “brought order out of chaos” (撥亂反正).

In considering current factional struggle allusions, the Duowei article reads like an effort by Xi’s factional rivals to caution Party members against becoming “a wise man submits to circumstances” like Qiao Guanhua, and not seek refuge with the modern “Gang of Four” (the Xi camp) in the dying days of the “Gang’s” rein lest they get sidelined once the “rightful” rulers of the Party return to power.

     SinoInsight  1     

• The MPS will improve its political position and unify its ideological understanding with the decisions and deployments of “Xi Jinping and Party Central.”
• Public security Party committees at all levels are responsible for implementing rectification.
• The public security apparatus will focus on eliminating the “poisonous influence” of Sun Lijun and others, eliminate “two-faced persons” and “two-faced factions” who form cliques for personal interests, and eliminate hidden political dangers.
• The MPS Party Committee must firmly grasp the “fundamental political attributes” of “the public security’s surname is Party” (公安姓黨).
• The MPS will ensure that public security teams are absolutely loyal, absolutely clean and honest, and absolutely reliable. Public security teams should always be highly consistent ideologically and politically with “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.”

OUR TAKE

The Oct. 24 “Chang’an Jian” article on the second segment of the national political and legal affairs apparatus “education and rectification” campaign indicates that Xi Jinping wants a thorough cleansing of the apparatus, and even the most senior officials in seemingly “untouchable” posts will be scrutinized.

Officials linked with the Jiang faction are at high-risk of being investigated, especially those who served in Jiang Zemin’s supra-authority 610 Office and the domestic political security bureau.

Xi is looking to ensure that the political and legal affairs apparatus, which has long been influenced by the Jiang faction, is “absolutely loyal” to him and cleared of “hidden political dangers” as he continues to lay the groundwork to claim a third office term at the 20th Party Congress.