Politics Watch: The Multiple Political Signals in Xi’s Jiangxi Tour

◎ Several political signals in Xi’s inspection trip to Jiangxi are meant for different groups within the Party.


Xi Jinping toured Jiangxi Province from May 20 to May 22. Chinese vice premier Liu He and Chinese Communist Party General Office director Ding Xuexiang accompanied Xi, as well as several top local officials.

Many observers believe that Xi’s Jiangxi inspection tour is aimed at the Sino-U.S. trade war. While we concur with this assessment, we also believe that Xi is looking to put his political rivals in the Party on notice with the Jiangxi tour.

The backdrop:
May 20

  • The CCP Central Military Commission issues the “Xi Jinping Strong Military Thought Learning Outline” to the armed forces for study, according to a Xinhua report.
  • At noon, Xi Jinping visits JL MAG Rare-Earth Co. in Jiangxi’s Ganzhou City. JL Mag is a significant producer of magnets that uses rare-earth elements. Ganzhou has half of the world’s heavy rare earths.
  • Later in the afternoon, Xi visited a monument marking the departure of the Red Army’s Long March in Yudu County and paid tribute with a flower basket.
  • After visiting the Long March monument, Xi went to a local vegetable farm and reiterated that the CCP’s “original aspiration” was to “fight for the people’s wellbeing and national rejuvenation.”

May 21

  • The CCP Central Committee issued regulations on Party cadre education management work and requested that all cadres comply with them, according to a Xinhua report.
  • In the morning of May 21, Xi Jinping inspected the PLA Army Infantry College in Jiangxi with CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia and met with military officials and experts.
  • In the afternoon, Xi held a symposium in Jiangxi’s Nanchang City to promote the region. National Development and Reform Commission head He Lifeng and the Party secretaries of Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan all made speeches at the symposium.

May 22
Xi Jinping held a morning meeting with the Party committee and government of Jiangxi Province to hear work reports.

The big picture:
Xi’s Jiangxi tour comes after a breakdown in Sino-U.S. trade negotiations and trusted official Liu Shiyu “turning himself in” to the anti-corruption authorities to assist in investigations.

Our take:
1. Many observers believe that Xi Jinping is signaling that the Chinese regime will strongly resist America in the trade war with his inspection tour in Jiangxi. First, Xi is reminding America and the world that they are dependant on China for rare earths. Second, Xi’s visit to the Long March monument telegraphs the message that the Chinese regime is ready for a protracted trade war with the United States.

We believe that the Chinese regime does not have as much rare earth “leverage” as many would think. In a piece analyzing whether rare earths are China’s “secret weapon” in a trade war, we wrote that “given China’s present economic, societal, political, and geopolitical problems, the CCP wouldn’t risk a “rare earth war,” invite an international embargo, and hasten its collapse.”

The Long March refers to the CCP Red Army’s two-year (1934-1936), 4,000 miles-long flight from Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang forces. The Red Army fled from Jiangxi and eventually established a base in Yan’an after traversing rough terrain and enduring tough weather conditions. CCP propaganda claims that the Long March was a “northward expedition to resist the Japanese” and exaggerates the distance traveled as 25,000 Chinese miles (about 7,767 miles). More importantly, CCP propaganda upholds the Long March as a symbol of how the Party is capable of “being reborn from desperate straits,” “growing stronger with greater adversity,” and “seizing victory at the final moment.”

2. Our research into CCP factional politics and understanding of Party operations have led us to spot several political signals in Xi Jinping’s Jiangxi tour which are meant for different groups within the Party:

2.1. Accompanying Xi in Jiangxi were Liu He and Ding Xuexiang, two of Xi’s confidants. Liu also attended the Nanchang symposium, which is in accordance with his portfolio (finance, industry, technology work) as the fourth-ranking vice premier (Liu did not speak at the symposium). Earlier this year, both Liu and Ding had accompanied Xi on inspection tours to Tianjin and Chongqing.

On one level, Xi is very likely signaling to his allies and trusted officials that he continues to support them in the face of adversity and setbacks. This is an important signal at a time when the Xi camp is being attacked by political rivals for its failure to defuse regime-threatening trade tensions with America. For instance, Liu He led the trade talks with his U.S. counterparts, but was unable to prevent the escalation of tariffs. Also targeted was former securities regulator and Xi camp official Liu Shiyu. Thus, Ding Xuexiang and Liu He’s public appearance alongside Xi is likely designed to be a confidence booster of sorts for those in the Xi camp and to show to the regime that Xi’s confidants (particularly Liu He) are not in trouble despite recent failings.

2.2. Based on our research, Xi Jinping previously toured CCP revolutionary sites after he met with serious internal pushback from the Jiang faction.[1] Touring revolutionary sites is a symbolic gesture which allows a Party leader to assert authority by tapping into the CCP’s revolutionary roots.

For Xi to visit the Long March monument is symbolic in considering Mao Zedong’s rise to power. Mao was only elected into the Politburo nine months before the Long March. However, Mao’s political maneuverings during the Red Army’s jaunt from Jiangxi to Yan’an led to his ascension to CMC chairman two months after the conclusion of the Long March. Mao would hold on to the CMC chairmanship until his death in 1976. Hence, by invoking the Long March, Xi is hinting that he, like Mao, faces tough internal opposition, but will eventually overcome adversity and triumph by the end of his “long march” against the Jiang faction and other Party interest groups that oppose him.

We noted that Xi’s authority has been weakened in analyzing the recent investigation of Liu Shiyu. We also noted that the “Xi leadership will almost certainly retaliate against political rivals once it steadies the ship and regains its footing.” Xi’s tour of Jiangxi is very likely an attempt to “steady the ship” before he makes a move against political rivals (“signal a left-turn to go right”).

2.3. The release of the “Xi Jinping Strong Military Thought Learning Outline” and Party cadre education management work regulations during the period of Xi’s Jiangxi trip appear to be aimed at strengthening Xi’s authority in the Party.

2.4. From state media photos of Xi’s visit to the PLA Army Infantry College, the officials whom he met with are mostly at the colonel rank. We believe that this is in line with Xi’s moves to groom and promote a younger generation of military officials to replace the senior officials who rose up the ranks during Jiang Zemin’s era of dominance (1997 to 2013).

What’s next:
1. The investigation of Liu Shiyu suggests that the Jiang faction and the Xi camp are in an uneasy political compromise. This compromise, however, will be broken should Xi move against high-ranking Jiang faction cadres or seek to challenge/overturn Jiang’s political legacy.

2. The greater the pressure exerted by the U.S. on China, the higher the probability that a political Black Swan event will occur in China.

Notes
[1]
◎ On July 11, 2013, Xi Jinping went on an inspection tour to Hebei’s Xibaipo. During his trip, Xi said that the CCP is facing and will undergo various “trials and exams.” On July 25, the authorities prosecuted Bo Xilai, the former Chongqing boss and Jiang faction elite.

In March 1949, the CCP entered Beiping (today’s Beijing) from Xibaipo. Then, Mao Zedong said, “Today, we’re entering Beiping to take the ‘imperial exams’…”

◎ On Oct. 30, 2014, Xi Jinping held a national military political work conference in Fujian’s Gutian Town. At the conference, Xi instructed senior military leaders to pay special and serious attention to the Xu Caihou case. Three days ago, the authorities had announced that anti-corruption investigations into Xu, the former CMC vice chair and Jiang faction elite, had concluded and that his case was being handled over to prosecutors.

From Dec. 28 to Dec. 29, 1929, the CCP 4th Red Army held its 9th conference at Gutian. Mao Zedong’s leadership over the 4th Red Army was affirmed at the Gutian Conference.

◎ On June 16, 2015, Xi Jinping toured the site of the Zunyi Conference, or a CCP meeting during the Long March (1935) where Mao Zedong emerged in a position to take command of the Red Army and the Party leadership. On June 11, Zhou Yongkang was sentenced to life imprisonment.

◎ On Feb. 2, 2016, Xi Jinping carried out an inspection tour of Jinggangshan revolutionary base in Jiangxi, his first trip there as CCP General Secretary. A day earlier, Xi had handed out military colors and passed on instructions to the theater command leaders and political commissars of the Chinese regime’s newly established theater commands. At the time, Xi was in the midst of implementing military modernization and reforms.

The CCP established its first revolutionary base in Jinggangshan in October 1927 after the failed Nanchang Uprising against the Kuomintang on Aug. 1 that year.